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ECONOMIC DETERMINATIONS IN “FRAND 
RATE”-SETTING: 
A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 
Jonathan D. Putnam* 
ABSTRACT 
Owners of standard-essential patents commit to be prepared to 
license their technology on “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” terms and conditions. When negotiations over such 
terms break down, arbitrators and courts may be tasked with 
determining them. Such determinations face unusual obstacles, such 
as the frequent inapplicability of patent damages law to pricing large, 
standardized patent portfolios. The absence of good legal guidance is 
compounded by an economic narrative – the “standard FRAND 
paradigm” – which systematically misstates the circumstances, 
objectives and requirements of a proper FRAND determination, 
systematically favoring implementers of the standard. I contrast this 
static paradigm with the proper, economically consistent, dynamic 
paradigm. I then explain why a “FRAND rate determination” is 
usually difficult – starting with the threshold error of confining the 
determination to a “FRAND rate.” I also identify related economic 
errors that pervade both expert economic testimony and legal 
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characterizations of the evidence in a typical proceeding. Because of 
the non-discrimination requirement, the consequences of such errors 
can persist indefinitely in later proceedings. In addition to 
highlighting these errors for prospective fact-finders, I close with a 
test for the legitimacy of a proposed FRAND determination. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When patent rights are transacted, most are priced in voluntary, 
private agreements covering large patent portfolios. While the parties 
to such transactions necessarily must agree on an aggregate price, 
they need not, and generally do not, agree on fundamental 
determinants of that price, such as how many units will be licensed, or 
whether the licensed patent rights are actually used in the licensed 
units, or indeed are valid at all. The terms, and often the existence, of 
such portfolio-wide transactions are usually confidential. 
When patent rights are exchanged involuntarily – through 
infringement – individual patents are asserted in adversarial 
proceedings, typically a patent infringement trial. If the patent holder 
can prove that the asserted patents are valid and infringed, the patents 
are then “priced” in the form of a compensatory damages award. 
Being public, such trials and pricing of individual patent rights are 
nearly the exclusive source of “patent damages law.”1 
In short, the pricing of most patents occurs in large, uncertain, 
voluntary, and private contracts, but the law that governs that pricing 
evolves from individual, certain, adversarial, and public proceedings. 
With the standardization of complex technologies comprising 
hundreds of inventions, and the need for firms to exchange the rights 
to large numbers of standard-essential patents (SEPs) on “fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms, demand has 
grown for a heretofore unusual hybrid: the pricing of patents in large, 
uncertain, adversarial, private contracts.2 Most commonly, the vehicle 
for devising such contracts is commercial arbitration.3 
In such arbitrations, arbitrators are tasked with determining 
“fair” terms for a large, uncertain patent portfolio. But the damages 
 
1. See e.g., JOHN SKENYON, CHRISTOPHER MARCHESE, & JOHN LAND, PATENT 
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE (2017). 
2. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable 
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1135, 1135 (2013) 
(arbitration of FRAND terms and conditions is only advisable). 
3. Id. 
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law on which they may rely they rely upon is based on individual, 
certain patents., the objective of that law being damages. In other 
words, the goal here is offer damages that adequately compensate the 
payee, as opposed to focusing on notions of fairness and equity,  
“adequate to compensate” the patentee – not “fairness.” 
In advocating their respective positions in such an arbitration, 
the patent holder and the licensee generally proffer testimony from 
economic experts, as they do in the damages phase of a patent 
infringement trial. But economists, for whom the “compensation” 
sought at trial is a familiar and well-defined standard, have no special 
expertise in determining “fairness,” which is the arbitrator’s 
objective.4 Given that it is hard for economists to price large numbers 
of patents, pricing them “fairly” invites speculation and expands the 
scope for error, not to mention mischief. 
Unsurprisingly, the disconnections between the arbitrators’ task 
and the applicable law, and between the desired and proffered expert 
testimony, may lead to confused, uncertain, unreliable and 
unjustifiable arbitration awards. 
So far, so bad: hard cases make bad law, but at least in the 
arbitration context they usually only make bad “private” law, because 
arbitration awards are generally confidential and unreviewable.5 
Unfortunately, bad arbitration awards do not remain hidden in 
the FRAND context, because (under the “ND” portion of FRAND), 
the patent holder undertakes not to discriminate among its licensees. 
Thus, a bad arbitration award lives on, to be examined again and 
again in subsequent arbitrations involving either of the parties, who 
have obvious incentives to emphasize or minimize the significance of 
the award in future proceedings. In such proceedings, future 
arbitrators must weigh not only the competing claims before them, 
 
4. Under the standard economic theory of “comparative statics,” economists compare an 
agent’s economic welfare in two or more states of the world.  When an agent experiences an 
inferior state (for example, the agent has been harmed), but is entitled by law to a superior 
state, the difference in welfare between the two states measures the agent’s compensation. 
Normative “fairness” is not a consideration in determining such objective compensation. See, 
e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS:  A MODERN APPROACH 251-69 
(Jack Repcheck ed., 8th ed. 2010).   
5. See, e.g., Sharon E. Schulte, Good Policy or Judicial Abdication: When Courts 
Uphold Arbitral Awards Which Are in Excess of the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction – Hall v. 
Superior Court, 1994 J. DISP. RESOL. (1994) (discussing the general rule that an arbitrator’s 
decision is, with limited exceptions, unreviewable on its merits). 
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but also how to square a “bad” prior decision with their own 
obligation, on behalf of the parties appearing before them, not to 
discriminate. 
The possibility of inconsistent, and persistent, arbitration awards 
with no prospect for “appellate” review and reconciliation suggests a 
systemic failure, which ultimately requires a systemic solution. As 
desirable as that might be, the present paper’s objectives are more 
modest. I provide a “guide to the perplexed” for arbitrators who find 
themselves in a FRAND proceeding. As an economist, I focus on the 
economics of this determination, including the proper scope of 
economic testimony, some of the errors that economic witnesses 
commonly make, and how non-economists can identify and probe 
such errors, to avoid their contamination of the final award. As I have 
explained, the fact of such errors poses difficult legal problems for 
arbitrators faced with inconsistent past results. Thus, I also suggest 
ways in which future arbitrators can anticipate and attempt to 
harmonize past inconsistencies. These suggestions in turn point the 
way towards better systemic solutions, which will likely mean 
changes in the law governing the pricing of standard-essential patents. 
Naturally, those changes will ultimately be the province of lawyers, 
not economists. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
I briefly review standard-essential patents and the FRAND regime 
that typically governs them. I also contrast the “standard FRAND 
paradigm” with a robust and balanced restatement of the policy 
objectives underlying the FRAND regime. In Section III I explain 
why FRAND determinations are intrinsically difficult, given the 
available data. In Section IV I also identify several common types of 
errors in economic testimony. Section V explores some of the 
spillover effects of such errors. Section VI concludes with some 
suggestions. 
II. STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND FRAND LICENSING 
A. Standards and Standard-Setting Organizations 
Traditionally, firms develop technology specific to their own 
products. Often, there is more than one way to skin a cat, so 
competing firms are able to create functional substitutes using their 
own proprietary apparatus and methods. Sometimes, firms develop 
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technology that they license out to others, either to competitors or to 
firms selling in other markets. 
Again, traditionally, there is no reason for one company’s 
product to inter-operate with another’s; no one expects to mount a 
Chevrolet brake on a Ford. But in some industries – such as networks, 
which require communications among devices – it is valuable to 
consumers if their products interoperate.6 Interoperability means that 
an Apple iPhone can communicate with a Samsung cellular base 
station, even though Apple and Samsung compete in the handset 
market.7 Were that not the case, handset manufacturers would have to 
sell base stations as well, and consumers of each handset brand could 
only communicate with others who had purchased the same brand. 
The resulting proprietary networks are inefficiently small. With 
interoperability, there is need only for a single network. Firms then 
compete based on (differentiated) handset features, not on the 
(common) communications interface. 
Standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”) and standard 
development organizations (“SDOs”) direct the development and 
selection of inventions into technical standards.8 For those standards 
in which the choice of technology is not arbitrary – the vast majority 
– committees of technical experts select among proposed technical 
contributions to pick the “best” overall combination. Unsurprisingly, 
when firms propose recent technology to a technical committee, that 
technology may be the subject of a patent or pending patent 
application. There is therefore an intimate linkage between the 
 
6.  Standards also exist when it is necessary or efficient to ensure minimum quality 
levels, or when other types of coordination increase public welfare or safety. Some standards, 
such as driving on the right-hand side of the road, or “green light means go,” are mostly or 
entirely arbitrary; others have desirable properties relative to alternatives. 
7.  National Communications System Technology & Standards Division, 
Interoperability, in Telecommunications: Glossary of Telecommunication Terms I-15 (1996) 
(defining “interoperability” as “[t]he condition achieved among communications-electronics 
systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can 
be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.”). 
8. According to the Federal Trade Commission, under the Standards Development 
Organization Act of 2004, “… the antitrust rule of reason applies to SDOs while they are 
engaged in standards development activities.”  See Standards Development Organization Act 
of 2004, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/standards-development-organization-act-
2004 [https://perma.cc/3HXX-GMFF]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (2004). 
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selection of the “best” technology for standardization, and patent, 
(and/or other intellectual property,) rights.9 
Critically, the selection of technical contributions into a standard 
is not the result of economic competition. In economic competition, 
sellers offer products or services, each having a combination of 
features, one of which is its price. Buyers select from among these 
offers the offer that best suits them, or that “maximizes their utility.” 
For some buyers, the “best” offer is also the cheapest offer; for others, 
the “best” offer is the highest-quality product; for still others, there 
exists a tradeoff among price and features that leads them to an 
intermediate-quality product, at an intermediate price.10 The car 
market provides a familiar example. The resulting market 
“equilibrium” is one in which the market “clears,” meaning that the 
number of cars offered for sale equals the number of cars purchased, 
at the equilibrium price(s).11 
In contrast, within an SDO, selection of technical contributions 
generally occurs without the use or knowledge of the price of the 
contributed technology, for several reasons. First, most SDO rules 
forbid the discussion of commercial terms or legal matters when 
evaluating technical contributions. ,12 They do this advisedly, as those 
SDO members who constitute technical standards bodies upstream 
are typically also horizontal competitors downstream, in the 
 
9.  See generally Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889 (2002). 
10. See, e.g., Varian, supra note 4.   
11.  See generally Steven Berry, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes, Automobile Prices 
in Market Equilibrium, 63 ECONOMETRICA 841 (1995). 
12.  See ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRS), EUR. TELECOMM. 
STANDARDS INS., http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-guide-on-ipr.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S2PG-BZ29] (last visited January 24, 2018) (“Specific licensing terms and negotiations are 
commercial issues between the companies and shall not be addressed within ETSI. Technical 
Bodies are not the appropriate place to discuss IPR Issues. Technical Bodies do not have the 
competence to deal with commercial issues. Members attending ETSI Technical Bodies are 
often technical experts who do not have legal or business responsibilities with regard to 
licensing issues. Discussion on licensing issues among competitors in a standards making 
process can significantly complicate, delay or derail this process.”).   
Here, as elsewhere in this paper, I illustrate the role and policies of SSOs by reference to 
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”), whose policy regarding 
intellectual property rights governs the development of cellular telecommunications standards. 
In any individual arbitration, the policy of the governing SDO will of course be the point of 
reference for the parties and the panel. 
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standardized product market.13 Conventional antitrust guidance 
strongly discourages any price-based decisions among horizontal 
competitors, whether in input or output markets.14 Second, even if 
such discussions were permissible, the members of standards 
committees are technical personnel charged with a common technical 
mission, for which consideration of “the pricing of contributions” is 
deemed both irrelevant and inefficient.15 Third, because patents are 
typically licensed in portfolios or other large groups, neither they nor 
the technical contributions they cover are “priced” individually. 
Moreover, the hypothetical pricing of individual contributions would 
almost surely conflict with the actual price charged when patents are 
transacted in large groups, because there is no agreed-upon method of 
adding up the “parts” to constitute the “whole.” At the very least, such 
comparisons would multiply the potential for disputes, and would 
expose the terms of confidential actual agreements.16 Finally, 
contributions to a technical standard are typically made after a patent 
application has been filed (to preserve the invention’s public novelty), 
but before the patent has issued (typically several years later), during 
which time the patent’s actual claims are subject to review, challenge 
and potential rejection, leaving them in flux.17 Thus, it is unclear what 
rights, exactly, are to be “priced” at the point the contribution is 
made. 
 
13.  Id. 
14.  See An Antitrust Primer for Federal Law Enforcement Personnel, at 4, 6.  U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 2005), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761666/download (“Price fixing 
is any agreement among competitors which affects the ultimate price or terms of sale for a 
product or service. It is not necessary, however, that the conspirators agree to charge exactly 
the same price for a given item…. Price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation are generally 
prosecuted criminally because they have been found to be unambiguously harmful, that is, per 
se illegal”).  
15.  See ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRS), supra note 12.  
16. The only way to compare the hypothetical price of an individual contribution with 
the actual price of a patent portfolio is to expose the portfolio agreement to independent 
review.  In general, there is no mechanism within an SDO that requires or protects the 
disclosure of the confidential commercial information of SDO members. See U.S. Department 
of Justice, supra note 14. 
17. According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the average interval 
from the time of patent application to the time of issuance, during which a patent’s claims are 
examined and allowed or rejected, was about 33-40 months in 2011, approximately the date 
that ETSI’s Long-term Evolution (LTE) standard was initially implemented in the United 
States.  See Pendency of Patent Applications (2 visuals), U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, https://developer.uspto.gov/visualization/pendency-patent-applications-2-visuals 
[https://perma.cc/84TZ-GG6L] (last visited May 22, 2018).      
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Once the set of technical contributions that together constitute 
the standard is set, standard-compliant devices must adhere to the 
standardized specification. To the extent that adherence to the 
standard means practicing the claims of a patent, any such patent is 
then considered a SEP.18 Again typically, however, SDOs do not 
themselves determine whether any given patent is a “standard-
essential patent.” In other words, even after a member’s technical 
contribution has been accepted and adopted into the standard, any 
patents associated with that contribution may nevertheless not meet 
the definition of a SEP.19 The important point is that no one knows, 
one way or the other, whether any given patent is essential to the 
standard. 
B. The Benefits and Costs of Standardization 
Standardization presents a number of potential benefits and 
costs. In addition to interoperability, the other principal benefit is that 
the SDO is able to combine the best proposals from every member, to 
create a common communications interface that is superior to – faster, 
more reliable, cheaper than – any individual firm’s technology. 
We can think of these two standardization benefits as “static” 
and “dynamic.” The static benefit – one that occurs at a given point in 
time, using off-the-shelf technologies – is the gain from 
interoperability, that is, from requiring every device to work the same 
way. The dynamic benefit – one that occurs over time – is the benefit 
 
18.  See ETSI IPRP Eur. Telecomm. Standards Ins. (Apr. 5, 2017), 
http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3CU-AB2H] 
(“’ESSENTIAL’ as applied to IPR means that it is not possible on technical (but not 
commercial) grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of the art 
generally available at the time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, 
repair, use or operate EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply with a STANDARD 
without infringing that IPR. For the avoidance of doubt in exceptional cases where a 
STANDARD can only be implemented by technical solutions, all of which are infringements 
of IPRs, all such IPRs shall be considered ESSENTIAL.”). 
19.  For example, suppose that an SDO member proposes technical contribution A, an 
invention that is also claimed by Patent 1. Suppose that the SDO adopts the substance of 
contribution A, which it then codifies in technical specification B. To simplify its proofs of 
infringement, the patentee files a “continuation” application, relying on the disclosure found in 
Patent 1 but using the language of B to draft new claims; these issue as another member of the 
same “patent family,” Patent 2. Then, assuming the definition of essentiality is met, Patent 2 
may be “standard-essential,” but Patent 1 may not. 
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of inducing firms to compete to find solutions to each technical 
problem, then choosing the best solution. 
Standardization also has potential costs. The potential cost that 
has captured by far the most attention from policymakers and 
standards implementers – and from the SSOs themselves – is the 
possibility of “hold-up” by the owner of a standard-essential patent. 
Hold-up is a form of economic opportunism, by which one party to a 
relationship takes advantage of the other party’s investment in that 
relationship, by attempting to renegotiate terms after the second party 
has sunk its investment. 
For example, suppose in the winter a homeowner solicits 
proposals from contractors to build a pool in the summer, on a time-
and-materials basis. The winning contractor takes a construction 
deposit; the losers fill their summer schedules with other work. 
Halfway through the job, the winning contractor demands an 
additional “completion fee” to finish. With her construction at risk, 
and unable to find another installer, the homeowner agrees to the 
demand. The homeowner has been held “held up” by the contractor. 
Of course, skilled attorneys anticipate such problems and draft 
contracts to avoid them, and/or to make such opportunism 
unprofitable. But when the parties cannot contract over the investment 
(in this case, the homeowner’s selection of one installer to the 
(permanent) exclusion of others), and when the price or another 
contractual parameter cannot be specified in advance, the potential for 
hold-up exists.20 
From a legal perspective, such opportunism is unfair. From an 
economic perspective, the main problem with opportunism is that, 
being foreseeable, it causes parties not to transact at all. In other 
words, parties fail to invest in otherwise profitable relationships, 
because they fear the counter-party will take advantage of them. Such 
foregone transactions are economically inefficient. 
 
20. More formally, hold-up occurs in the presence of two factors: 
1. Parties to a transaction make noncontractible, relationship-specific 
investments, before the transaction takes place. 
2. Some parameter of the transaction (price, quality, quantity, date) cannot be 
specified with certainty. 
See William P. Rogerson, Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, 59 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 777, 777 (1992). 
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In the context of standard-essential patents, hold-up could arise 
under the following facts: 
(a) the owner of an SEP makes a technical contribution, any 
implementation of which practices the claims of the patent; 
(b) the SDO selects the contribution into the standard, without 
specifying a price for the SEP; 
(c) implementers invest in the implementation of the claims of 
the SEP, as part of their implementation of the standard; 
(d) the patent owner seeks “extra” payment for the use of the 
SEP, exploiting the implementers’ prior implementation 
investment and lack of alternatives. 
Since such conduct by SEP owners is foreseeable, implementers 
might refuse to invest in implementing the standard, thus depriving all 
concerned of the benefits of standardization. 
To pre-empt this undesirable outcome, SSOs routinely require 
that those who contribute to a technical standard must promise to 
forego such opportunism. This promise takes the form of a “FRAND 
undertaking,” by which the holder of an SEP promises to be prepared 
to grant a license on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” 
terms.21 Unlike most other SSOs, ETSI further requires that 
contributors to technical standards disclose the identity of related 
patent rights that “may be essential” to the standard.22 While 
sometimes called “declared-essential patents,” patents identified in 
this manner only have the (subjectively believed) potential to be 
essential, at the time of the declaration.23 
 
21. The ETSI undertaking is exemplary: 
To the extent that the IPR(s) disclosed in the attached IPR Information 
Statement Annex are or become, and remain ESSENTIAL in respect of the 
ETSI Work Item, STANDARD and/or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 
identified in the attached IPR Information Statement Annex, the Declarant 
and/or its AFFILIATES are (1) prepared to grant irrevocable licenses under 
this/these IPR(s) on terms and conditions which are in accordance with Clause 
6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy.  
See ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRS), supra note 12.  Other SDOs omit 
“fair” as a requirement, though I am aware of no rate-setting decision that has turned on this 
distinction. 
22.  See id. at “IPR Information Statement and Licensing Declaration” (“In accordance 
with Clause 4.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy the Declarant and/or its AFFILIATES hereby informs 
ETSI that it is the Declarant’s and/or its AFFILIATES’ present belief that the IPR(s) disclosed 
in the attached IPR Information Statement Annex may be or may become ESSENTIAL…). 
23. Id. 
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C. The “Standard FRAND Paradigm” 
With this background, one can efficiently characterize what may 
be called the “standard FRAND paradigm.” This paradigm appears as 
a stock character in FRAND arbitrations and similar disputes. 
Although it is empirically unsupported, and typically has little or no 
relevance to the facts or expert testimony of an individual case, the 
“standard FRAND paradigm” forms an important part of what (some) 
parties deem to be fair conduct; the failure to conform to the paradigm 
is, so this argument goes, per se evidence that a patent holder has 
violated its FRAND undertaking.24 
Under this paradigm, the relevant sequence of events may be 
described below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This sequence conforms to the textbook definition of a hold-up 
problem: following the standardization of the technology by the SDO, 
the implementer must invest in implementing the standardized 
technology – not knowing whether, or in what form, patent claims on 
the technology may exist, nor knowing their price. Eventually, the 
patent office issues a patent, crystallizing its claims; still later, the 
innovator/patentee offers to license the now-standard-essential patent, 
at a price that the implementer finds “excessive,” and therefore a 
 
24.   See, e.g., Policy Statement on Remedies For Standards-Essential Patents Subject to 
Voluntary F/RAND Commitments, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8VP-6WQA].  
 
Figure 1: Static Standardization 
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violation of the patentee’s FRAND undertaking. The typical 
explanation for the “excess”: hold-up by the patentee, who is 
exploiting the implementer’s specific investment in the standardized 
technology, for which the implementer now lacks any alternative. 
The patentee may respond that the offered price is the same as 
the actual price paid by existing licensees, as shown in actual 
contracts. The patentee may further point to the ETSI IPR Policy 
itself, which historically has favored the negotiation of such 
contracts.25 But under the “standard FRAND paradigm,” the prices 
observed in actual license agreements are themselves contaminated by 
the patentee’s hold-up of its other licensees. They are, therefore, 
uniformly unreliable and ought not to be admitted as evidence. In 
other words, hold-up is so pervasive that one cannot even test for its 
existence, given the available data. 
The “standard FRAND paradigm’s” solution to this alleged 
evidentiary vacuum is to postulate a so-called “ex ante price” for the 
standardized patent. The “ex ante price” is the price that the patentee 
supposedly could have charged, at a point in time before 
implementers sink their investments into the standardized technology, 
as shown in Figure 1, because it is at that point that the patentee 
would have had to “bid” against competing alternatives for selection 
into the standard, thereby “locking in” implementers to the 
investment.26 That bid, so the paradigm goes, is the maximum value 
that the patentee could have expected in a “competitive market,” and 
reflects only the value of the technology itself – not the additional 
market power, and potential for opportunism, conveyed by the 
patent’s selection into the standard.27 The decision to value the 
 
25.  See, e.g., Interim Report of the UMTS IPR Working Group, EUR. TELECOMM. 
STANDARDS INS. (Sept. 2008), http://www.qtc.jp/3GPP/GSM/SMG_27/tdocs/P-98-0608.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C799-M5RZ] (“The value of the ETSI IPR Policy as the sole vehicle for the 
handling of IPR issues relating to standards lies in . . . the fact that the complex commercial 
issues of the details of licenses and of compensation therefore, are placed where they belong, 
at the center of bilateral negotiations between licensor and licensee”) (emphasis supplied).     
26.  Though not required as a matter of economic theory, implementers have argued, 
and trial courts have sometimes accepted, that the price-determination date should also precede 
the point in time when the SDO selects the patentee’s contribution. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. 
D-Link Systems, Inc. 733 F.3d 1201, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (providing an example of how 
courts have accepted the price-determination date from the point in time where the SDO 
selects the patentee’s contribution). 
27.  The distinction between the “value of the technology” and the “value of the 
standard” has found its way into patent damages law. See id. at 1233. 
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technology “ex ante” is said to conform to common practice within 
patent damages law, which hypothesizes a negotiation between the 
patentee and licensee “on the eve of infringement.”28 
Further, when measuring the value of this hypothetical bid, the 
court should consider only the “incremental value” of the technology 
over its next-best alternative29 that would have been available to the 
technical standards body – again, a widely approved approach in 
patent damages law.30 
Elements of the “standard FRAND paradigm” have found their 
way into high-level policy statements echoed by the major US 
regulatory agencies.31 And as a legal matter, a patentee’s FRAND 
undertaking is now treated as a contract with the SDO, of which an 
implementer is a third-party beneficiary who has its own cause of 
action for breach of the FRAND contract.32 
 
28.  See Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA, 331 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (noting that hypothetical negotiation occurs “at a time before the infringing activity 
began”). Accord Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
LaserDynamics, Inc.v. Quanta Computers, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 75 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that 
hypothetical negotiation takes place the date infringement began). 
29.   See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., et al., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, 
at *27-28 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (holding that a comparison of the patented technology to the 
alternatives that the SDO could have written into the standard is a consideration in determining 
a RAND royalty).  
30.  See Grain Processing v. American Maize Prod. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (“Only by comparing the patented invention to its next-best available alternative . . . can 
the court discern the market value of the patent owner’s exclusive right, and therefore his 
expected profit or reward”).   
31.   See, e.g., Policy Statement on Remedies For Standards-Essential Patents Subject to 
Voluntary F/RAND Commitments, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf [https://perma.cc/LR3X-YEC6] 
[hereinafter DOJ SEP Policy].  
32.  As courts have found, when a holder of a standards-essential patent makes a 
commitment to an SDO to license such patents on F/RAND terms, it does so for the intended 
benefit of members of the SDO and third parties implementing the standard. These putative 
licensees are beneficiaries with rights to sue for breach of that commitment. See Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030-33 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Microsoft Corp. 
v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999-1001 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[The] district court’s conclusions that 
Motorola’s RAND declarations to the ITU created a contract enforceable by Microsoft as a 
third-party beneficiary (which Motorola concedes), and that this contract governs in some way 
what actions Motorola may take to enforce its ITU standard-essential patents (including the 
patents at issue in the German suit), were not legally erroneous.”); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola 
Mobility, Inc., —- F. Supp. 2d —-, No. 11-cv-178bbc, 2012 WL 3289835, at *21-22 (W.D. 
Wis. Aug. 10, 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178bbc, 2011 WL 
7324582, at *7-11 (W.D. Wis. June 10, 2011). See DOJ SEP Policy, supra note 31, at 7. 
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While FRAND-based licensing policies have given rise to 
dozens or hundreds of voluntary licenses, some implementers insist 
that the entire regime that produced these licenses “does not work.”33 
For example, Apple insists that using the price of a handset, such as 
an iPhone, to meter the value of a standard-essential patent portfolio 
is “inherently discriminatory,”34 and therefore non-FRAND.35 
Similarly, Apple claims that the “best” method for determining 
royalties for standard-essential patents practiced by a handset is to 
employ the price paid for the so-called “smallest salable patent 
practicing unit,” which Apple identifies as the handset’s baseband 
processor chipset – a method not employed in actual industry 
agreements.36 Despite having launched arguably the most successful 
consumer product in history, Apple even claims to have “faced 
excessive royalty demands, onerous contract terms and the threat of 
injunctions barring the sale of a revolutionary new product,” “a 
history . . . [that] has left [the FRAND licensing] promise at least 
partially unfulfilled.”37 Faced with these economic headwinds, Apple 
has sold just 1.2 billion iPhones in 10 years, worth $738 billion.38 
In this ostensibly fallen world, some widely cited commentators 
have argued that arbitration of FRAND terms and conditions is not 
only advisable, but should be made mandatory by the SDO.39 
Whether an SDO mandates arbitration or not, under the “standard 
FRAND paradigm” arbitrators face a formidable array of “settled” 
justifications for FRAND policies in general, and for vindicating the 
rights of the implementer in particular, that invariably point to a 
reduction in the rates to be paid for standardized technology – 
 
33.  See, e.g., Letter from B.J. Watrous to Telecom Regulatory Authority of India,. (Nov. 
10, 2017), http://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/Apple_%20Inc_CP_PLTEM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8KLK-VNYQ] (“What does not work in practice are [average sales price]- or 
use-based methodologies for determining FRAND royalties”). 
34.  Id. 
35.   Id.  
36.  See id. 
37.  See id. 
38.  Ian Morris, Apple Has Sold 1.2 Billion iPhones Worth $738 Billion In 10 Years, 
FORBES (June 29, 2017),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/ianmorris/2017/06/29/apple-has-sold-
1-2-billion-iphones-worth-738-billion-in-10-years/ [https://perma.cc/W4MD-LGQ3] 
39.  See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2 (arguing that arbitration of FRAND terms and 
conditions is not only advisable, but should be made mandatory by the SDO).  But see Pierre 
Larouche, Jorge Padilla and Richard S. Taffet, Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory 
Arbitration a Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?, 10 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 
581, 581 (2014) (coming up with an opposite holding). 
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regardless of how many others may have voluntarily accepted those 
rates in the past. The present question is whether the “standard 
FRAND paradigm” assists arbitrators in executing the task before 
them: to identify terms and conditions that are truly “fair,” 
“reasonable” and “non-discriminatory.”40 The short answer to that 
question: no. 
D. The Failures of the Standard Paradigm 
The simplest way to encompass the standard paradigm’s errors 
in a single view is to consider the differences between the static gains 
from standardization, and its dynamic gains. In the standard 
paradigm, gains arise from the agreement by all participants to settle 
on a single, agreed-upon, existing technology. These are the gains 
from agreeing to drive on the same side of the (existing) road. Since 
the alternatives – left side or right side – already exist and are largely 
equivalent, it makes little or no difference which alternative becomes 
“the standard.” And any reward to the chosen alternative is simply a 
windfall, since both the chosen alternative and its perfect or near-
perfect substitutes came into existence exogenously, before the 
possibility of standardization even existed.  Society gains, not from 
the particular alternative, but from the coordination that results from 
agreeing on a single alternative. In short, these are “coordination 
gains.” Rewarding the (private) owner of the chosen alternative for 
the (social) decision to coordinate is not only misplaced; it is “unfair,” 
because any such reward comes at the expense of those for whom the 
coordination occurs: implementers, and their customers. 
But this account of technological standardization leaves 
unexplained where the candidate technical contributions came from – 
it simply assumes their existence. Such accounts of the process are 
“static,” because they assume (and hold constant) the state of 
technology as it exists at the single point in time when coordination 
 
40. While it is still in wide circulation among competition-oriented economists, evidence 
for any of the constituent elements of the “standard FRAND paradigm” has been found 
lacking. See e.g. Certain 3G Mobile Headsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-613, USITC Pub. 4145 (Apr. 
2015) (Remand) at 63 (“Of all the settlements and licenses that were taken under the ‘threat’ of 
an exclusion order, not one respondent has gone on to file in a district court that the agreement 
was outside the range of FRAND.  The ITC has not seen such a case, the experts presented at 
the hearing have not seen such a case, and the respondents did not cite an example of such a 
case. With that in mind, perhaps now we can relax our guard a little.”). 
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occurs. In contrast, by far the greater gains from standardization are 
“dynamic” – that is, those gains induced over time by improvements 
in technology. These gains arise because innovators invest in R&D, 
with the fruits of which they compete for selection into the standard. 
That selection process is fundamentally different from market-based 
R&D competition, because it is “winner take all”: the best invention 
is culled from among those proposed, and is then used by all firms; 
the other candidates are discarded. The errors introduced when the 
outcomes realized under static market competition are substituted for 
those appropriate to a dynamic, winner-take-all regime are well-
known, as I explain below. 41  
In short, for all of the supposed consensus reflected in the 
“standard FRAND paradigm,” the trouble with the paradigm is that it 
contradicts standard economics. For this reason, the paradigm also 
cannot produce “FRAND outcomes.”42 At each step, the paradigm is 
incomplete, or flat wrong. 
1. The Sequence of Investments 
The sequence of events under dynamic standardization is shown 
in Figure 2. In order for the SDO to have something to standardize, 
contributors to the standard must first conduct R&D, to develop 
potential contributions. R&D is, of course, a costly investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41.  As I explain below, the result of such a policy is “dynamically inconsistent.” 
42.  See Jonathan D. Putnam, The “Standard FRAND Paradigm” is Not Standard. Or 
FRAND (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
970 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:953 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D conducted in anticipation of potential standardization does 
not arise randomly or exogenously, of course. Firms invest in R&D 
because the SDO – usually with the innovating firms’ participation – 
has promulgated certain general objectives for the standardized 
technology. R&D conducted in anticipation of potential 
standardization is also, therefore, a “relationship-specific” investment, 
because standardization – by definition – reduces or eliminates 
alternative uses of technologies that are not selected into the standard, 
but could have competed with it. There is usually no “second SDO” 
or other customer to whom a losing contribution can be offered. 
As with static standardization, the process of dynamic 
standardization proceeds with the selection of one contribution into 
the standard from among those proposed, followed by investments by 
implementers, issuance of the patent, and license negotiations, as both 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show. We can therefore conceive of dynamic 
standardization as economists often do, as a two-period model in 
which innovators conduct R&D in the first period, while the SDO 
standardizes on the winning technology to be implemented in the 
second period. Figure 2 shows how the “standard” model of static 
standardization is embedded within the dynamic model. Thus, in this 
context as in many others at the intersection of intellectual property 
and antitrust policies, the two-period process of dynamic 
Figure 2: Dynamic Standardization 
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standardization contains static standardization (in the second period) 
as a special case, when there is no need to explain where the 
standardized inventions came from. Of course, when standards evolve 
with technological change – and a principal objective of 
standardization is to ensure that technological change occurs as 
rapidly and efficiently as possible – such “special cases” are not only 
irrelevant, but misleading. 
Thus, the first error of the standard paradigm is to ignore both 
the investments required to generate the candidate contributions from 
which the SDO will choose, and the inducements on which such 
investments have relied. 
2. The Hold-up Problem 
As we have seen, hold-up can occur when parties make non-
contractible, relationship-specific investments, and when they cannot 
specify in advance all the terms of the contract governing their 
relationship.43 By this definition, innovators also face hold-up: to 
compete for selection into the standard, they must (1) invest in R&D; 
but they do so (2) with no assurance of the price or other terms of 
their compensation, other than that such compensation is supposed to 
be “fair.”44 
Because both innovators and implementers make relationship-
specific investments, and because neither group can specific ex ante 
the terms of the contract on which they will eventually agree, the 
standard-setting process inherently contains the potential for bilateral 
hold-up. As with hold-up by innovators, hold-up by implementers 
takes the form of exploiting the innovators’ prior (R&D) investment 
to extract opportunistic gains from the relationship. Just as innovators 
can hold up implementers by demanding a price that is “too high” ex 
post, implementers can hold up innovators by demanding a price that 
is “too low” ex post. The “hold-up problem” is therefore symmetric. 
When implementers hold up innovators, the situation is 
sometimes called “reverse hold-up” or “hold-out.”45 The “standard 
 
43. Rogerson, supra note 20. 
44. See ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRS), supra note 12 (IPR holders 
whether members of ETSI and their AFFILIATES or third parties, should be adequately and 
fairly rewarded for the use of their IPRs in the implementation of STANDARDS and 
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS”).  
45. See infra note 42. 
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FRAND paradigm” erroneously omits the innovator’s half of that 
hold-up problem. 
In an adversarial arbitration – in which, by definition, the parties 
have failed to agree on terms and conditions for the exchange of 
patent rights – the arbitrators thus face two competing, conceptually 
symmetric narratives: the implementer can point to the failure to 
agree as evidence of hold-up, because the offered terms are “too 
high”; the innovator can point to the same failure to agree as evidence 
of hold-out, because the counter-offered terms are “too low.” But it is 
fair to say that the great weight of academic commentary and 
“concern” expressed by antitrust regulators has fallen on the side of 
hold-up, with concerns about hold-out often being considered 
speculative and “amorphous.” 
In an actual arbitration, the positions of the parties may be more 
nuanced than the stylized representation described here. Often, each 
party is both an innovator and an implementer; they are exchanging 
rights patent rights via a cross-license. In theory, this means that each 
party should advocate both narratives: a high price for its own 
technology, and a low price for its adversary’s. Of course, such 
advocacy is tricky, because the arguments supporting either position 
generally apply to both parties. In practice, however, the parties 
usually anticipate that, despite their countervailing claims, one party 
is the “net licensor,” while the other is the “net licensee,” with the end 
result of the license being some kind of “balancing payment” from the 
net licensee to the net licensor.46 Under such circumstances, the net 
licensee’s net interest – the lowest possible balancing payment to the 
net licensor – coincides with the implementer’s “low price” narrative, 
while the net licensor’s opposing interest coincides with the 
innovator’s “high price” narrative. Thus, in an individual arbitration, 
each party can avoid the charge of hypocrisy by adopting the 
narrative most closely aligned with its interests. And because 
arbitrations are usually confidential, a party who appears as a net 
licensee in one arbitration and a net licensor in another is generally 
free to advocate whichever narrative best advances its immediate 
interests. In general, no “estoppel” attaches to such inconsistent 
positions.47 
 
46. See infra Section III.A. 
47. Id. 
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Arbitrators must be aware of these structural inconsistencies, 
which are occasioned by the likelihood that the same firm will appear 
as the net licensee against a “stronger” firm (i.e., one having the 
larger claim), but a net licensor against a “weaker” firm.48 
While the positions of innovator and implementer in a FRAND 
arbitration are conceptually and economically symmetric, they are not 
legally symmetric. Under the rules of most SDOs, the innovator 
commits to the SDO to be prepared to license on FRAND terms. As 
explained above, this commitment has been interpreted to have the 
force of a contract, of which the implementer is a third-party 
beneficiary. The failure to keep that commitment is thus interpreted as 
a “breach of contract.” On the other hand, while an innovator may 
also expect “fair” compensation, implementers do not undertake to 
ensure “fair” compensation – or, indeed, any compensation at all – as 
a condition of their implementation of the standardized technology.49 
In fact, implementers need enter into no undertaking with the SDO of 
any kind. Thus, while “hold-up” may constitute a “breach of contract” 
by the innovator, “hold-out” by the implementer is not a “breach” of 
anything.50 
 
48.  In a recent paper, I surveyed developments in FRAND-related litigation, and 
summarized the relative positions of the major innovators and implementers of telecom-related 
standard-essential patents. See Jonathan D. Putnam, Latest Developments in FRAND and SEP 
Litigation Intellectual Asset Management Yearbook (2016) (characterizing the bargaining 
positions of telecommunication firms based on their shares of sales and of industry SEPs).  
Based on the then-current market shares and patent holdings of these firms, Table 1 of that 
paper shows that certain firms (those having both significant sales and significant SEP 
portfolios) are more likely to appear as both “net licensors” and “net licensees,” while others 
are more likely to appear as either a net licensor or net licensee).  
49. For example, ETSI does not require a standard implementer to commit to any 
particular compensation for contributors to the standard as a condition of implementing its 
standard.  See ETSI IPR Policy, supra note 12. 
50.  Some litigants have argued that, in the particular case of ETSI, French law (which 
governs the ETSI IPR Policy) imposes on both parties the duty to negotiate in good faith. 
Hold-out could then be interpreted to violate that duty. The consequences of such an alleged 
violation are unclear.  
Bad-faith holdout may, however, deprive an implementer of its third-party benefit 
under the SDO contract, and/or permit an SEP holder to seek equitable relief. In one 
of the few decisions to define and find holdout on the part of an implementer, an 
administrative law judge of the U.S. International Trade Commission determined 
that Microsoft’s conduct met the definition of bad-faith holdout, finding Microsoft 
to be an “unwilling licensee” subject to an exclusion order. 
 
[Microsoft and its predecessor-in-interest, Nokia] argued at length th[at] 
[InterDigital] violated FRAND, against the testimony of their own witnesses. They 
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3. “Ex ante” 
Because the standard paradigm misspecifies the sequence 
relevant of events, and ignores the implementer’s half of the hold-up 
problem, it should be unsurprising that the standard paradigm’s 
proposed treatment of the problem – “ex ante” valuation of the 
standardized technology – is as unreliable as its diagnosis. 
As Figure 1 shows, under the static standardization model, the 
division between the “ex ante” and “ex post” period occurs prior to 
the implementer’s investment in the standardized technology – 
preferably, under the standard paradigm, prior to the SDO’s selection 
of the technology. This choice of negotiation date blunts the 
innovator’s supposedly superior and undeserved bargaining power, by 
giving the SDO the freedom to select a different technology. But as 
Figure 2 shows, under the dynamic standardization model, this date 
coincides with the point in time after each of the innovators has sunk 
its investment in R&D, but before the SDO has committed to reward 
any of the innovators by selecting its innovation. Thus, if (contrary to 
fact) an innovator were permitted to “bid” for selection of his 
technology into the standard, and if the alternatives he faced were to 
(1) lower his bid in hopes of his technology being selected, thus 
receiving a reduced return on his prior R&D investment, or (2) lose 
the bid entirely to a lower-priced innovator and receive no return on 
investment at all, then strategy (1) dominates strategy (2), for all 
innovators. In short, the standard FRAND paradigm proposes that 
 
argued the offers were not FRAND for a variety of reasons, but had no evidence to 
support even one assertion. There is however, one course of action that can clearly 
demonstrate bad faith, and that is a failure to meaningfully negotiate. This was the 
case in Realtek v. LSI . . . and is the case here . . . . In failing to negotiate in a 
meaningful way, and refusing to take a license, [Microsoft] is currently an unwilling 
licensee that “is unable or refuses to take a FRAND license[.]” 
 
 . . . evidence in this case supports a finding that MMO engaged in reverse holdup or 
holdout. In reviewing and considering the letters written by the FTC, DOJ, and 
PTO, the ALJ considered the concerns that the agencies raised regarding the 
potential abuse of the SEP patents, and finds that no such abuse occurred in this 
case. There was no evidence in the case that the risks raised by the agencies 
occurred in this case . . . . Therefore, there is no evidence in this case, either 
presented by the parties, within the public interest factors of 19 USC §1337, or in 
the policy letters, comments or submissions from other agencies or companies that 
an exclusion order should not be issued. 
See Certain 3G Mobile Handsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-613 USITC Pub. 4145 (Apr. 2015), 
(Remand). 
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innovations be priced as if innovators had engaged in a “race to the 
bottom” bidding war in which their R&D costs, being sunk, are 
irrelevant. The “ex ante” date advocated by implementers is, in short, 
the point in time of minimum innovator bargaining power, and 
maximum implementer bargaining power. 
Under the dynamic standardization model, if one believed that 
proper compensation could only be calculated “ex ante,” free of the 
potential for hold-up, then that point in time is not immediately prior 
to the implementer’s sinking its investment in the (actually) 
standardized technology, but immediately prior to the innovator’s 
sinking its investment in the (potentially) standardized technology. In 
other words, if the hold-up problem is bilateral and symmetric, then 
“ex ante” must mean “before either party has made its relationship-
specific investment.” As Figure 2 shows, this point in time necessarily 
precedes the time proposed under the standard paradigm. It also 
removes the unwarranted bargaining power that the standard 
paradigm erroneously bestows upon implementers. 
The “ex ante” approach also suffers from the comparatively 
benign infirmity that it is impossible to implement, because in 
practice there are no such things as “ex ante” prices. These prices do 
not exist for many reasons: there is no “ex ante” market; there are no 
“ex ante” trades; usually, there are not even “ex ante” patents, 
because as Figures 1 and 2 show, the patent office has not issued the 
patents at the time the SDO makes its selection. Thus, in arguing for 
“ex ante” pricing, advocates of the standard FRAND paradigm 
purport to have spotted a mythical beast: no economist has ever, even 
in theory, calculated an “ex ante,” pre-standardization price, as 
evidenced by the absence of any citation in the “standard FRAND 
paradigm” to an academic paper or treatise that supports such a 
calculation. 
To his credit, Judge James L. Robart recognized, in Microsoft v. 
Motorola, that “ex ante” pricing lacks “real-world applicability.”51 
That admission contrasts with the position advanced by Lemley and 
Shapiro, who argue that “the point of the hypothetical negotiation rule 
in patent damages is to determine what hypothetical reasonable 
parties might have done, had they had all the facts, including 
 
51.   Microsoft Corp., 696 F.3d at 898.  
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knowledge of non-infringing alternatives.”52 But this general 
restatement of patent damages law ignores the specific problem that 
“ex ante” prices do not exist, so it is impossible even to hypothesize 
what parties negotiating “ex ante” would do “if they had all the facts.” 
What Lemley and Shapiro appear to have in mind is some kind of 
comparison of the marginal physical product of each alternative 
(roughly speaking, a measure of its technical superiority over the 
next-best alternative), which in one way or another must have been 
the basis of the SDO’s selection decision, as an indicator of the 
winner’s “incremental value.” But even that refinement is 
conceptually incorrect. 
4. “Incremental value” 
Citing long-established patent damages law, the standard 
FRAND paradigm states that the standardized invention should be 
priced based on its “incremental value.”53  In the static standardization 
paradigm, the SDO considers various alternatives and selects the best, 
but always (at least in theory) having been able to switch to the 
second-best alternative. The difference in the value of the 
standardized product when using these two alternatives is the value of 
the chosen alternative, or potentially an “upper bound” on that 
value.54 
 
52.  Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 1148. 
53.  When dealing with SEPs, there are two special apportionment issues that arise. 
First, the patented feature must be apportioned from all of the unpatented features reflected in 
the standard. Second, the patentee’s royalty must be premised on the value of the patented 
feature, not any value added by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology. See 
Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1231 (holding that the royalty award is “based on the incremental value 
that the patented invention adds to the product, not any value added by the standardization of 
that technology”) (emphasis added).  When contemplating this value, it is not always clear 
what “increment” is envisioned: it could be the notional change in price of the patented 
product with the patented feature removed, or it could be the notional change in price of the 
patented product with the “next-best available non-infringing alternative” substituted in place 
of the patented feature. 
54. The hypothetical negotiation needs to take place under conditions where the 
alternative specifications have been identified, so that the parties are well informed about the 
best potential non-infringing alternatives to the proposed standard. The key idea here is that a 
reasonable royalty should reflect what would happen as a result of well-informed ex ante 
technology competition. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 1148 (holding that the 
incremental value of the patented technology over and above the next-best alternative serves as 
an upper bound to the reasonable royalties). 
2018] ECONOMIC DETERMINATIONS AND FRAND 977 
This definition of value – the gain over an alternative – is deeply 
rooted in economic theories of market competition and competitive 
equilibrium. In such theories, competitive equilibrium is determined 
by consumers and producers choosing their best alternative while 
foregoing their next-best alternative, the gain over the foregone 
alternative being the incremental value of the best alternative. When 
all consumers and producers behave in this fashion, the resulting 
equilibrium price causes the market to “clear”: supply equals 
demand.55 That price is, in a fundamental sense, “fair” and 
“reasonable,” on the one hand, and “efficient” and “consistent” on the 
other. 
But competing for selection into a standard is not a “market 
competition.” No prices are involved, because the discussion of prices 
(and commercial terms more generally) is banished from the 
standardization process.56 Therefore, a firm proposing a technical 
contribution cannot reduce its “price” in an effort to increase the 
likelihood of making a “sale” to the SDO. In mathematical terms, 
profit is not a differentiable function of price, because the price of the 
contribution is irrelevant to the SDO’s decision and therefore to the 
contributor’s profit.57 The only thing that matters to the SDO is the 
quality of the contribution. 
But even more fundamentally, standardization is a winner-take-
all process, in which – unlike market competition – there can be only 
one winner, by definition. And unlike market competition, the value 
of winning is the difference between serving 100% of the market and 
serving 0%. Again in mathematical terms, since quantity outcomes 
are binary – all of the market, or none of it – profit is not a 
differentiable function of the level of output. Standardization thus 
magnifies the difference between winning and losing, relative to 
market competition. 
To see this in a simple example, suppose that in period 1 two 
firms conduct R&D, each spending 50. In period 2, they compete in a 
product market, based on the results of their R&D in the first period. 
Firm A’s invention is superior, so (relative to its normalized profit 
 
55. See Varian, supra note 4, at 293-315. 
56. See, e.g., ETSI IPR Policy, supra note 12. 
57. For f(x) to be differentiable function of x, the value of f(x) must vary smoothly as a 
function of x.  Because profit (f(x)) does not vary smoothly as a function of price (x), the 
function is not differentiable.   
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without doing any R&D) it earns 60 in period 2, while Firm B earns 
40.58 Two results follow: (1) the aggregate return on R&D in period 2 
(100) is just sufficient to justify the aggregate R&D investment in 
period 1 (100), even though Firm A earns a modest positive return on 
its investment (+10), while Firm B earns a modest loss (–10); (2) the 
“incremental value” of Firm 1’s invention over Firm 2’s is 20, while 
its “incremental value” over the “no R&D” outcome is 60. 
Now suppose instead that competition in period 2 is 
standardized, with both firms using Firm A’s invention. Because of 
the gains from coordination, the aggregate return increases to 110.59 
Suppose that the gain from coordination (110 – 100 = 10) should not 
be imputed to the invention, but to the standard’s implementers and 
their customers, so neither Firm A nor Firm B can lay claim to it. But 
that result begs the question: what reward should the winning 
innovative firm (Firm A) receive? 
Under the standard paradigm (static standardization), R&D is 
irrelevant; the inventions “already existed.” Thus, if one were to 
ignore the costs of R&D, one would conclude that the “incremental 
value” of A over the next-best alternative is 20.60 But precisely 
because it ignores the cost of R&D, that conclusion is erroneous. If 
Firm A knew that it would receive a reward of 20 following an 
investment of 50, it would never have invested 50 in the first place, 
because it would lose money. 
Advocates of the standard paradigm often point out that R&D is 
a risky activity, that there is no guarantee that R&D will be 
 
58.  These results can be generated more formally.  Consider a Cournot model, in which 
two firms A and B sell a single homogenous product and maximize their own profits by 
choosing the optimal quantity to produce, given the other firm’s quantity.  If Firm A’s 
invention confers on its owner a greater cost advantage than does Firm B’s invention, then in 
equilibrium Firm A’s market share will exceed Firm B’s. See Varian, supra note 4 at 509. This 
additional structure is, however, unnecessary to the basic point.  
59.  Because both firms are using A’s superior invention, the aggregate return should 
increase still further. For present purposes, we abstract from this additional gain. 
60.  See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 898 (9th Cir. 2012) (providing 
an additional example of how to use an incremental approach to determine reasonable 
royalties). Using an example to explain this incremental approach, Dr. Murphy stated: 
What you’d ideally like to do is sit down and say: Okay, Kevin, you’ve 
contributed this piece of technology. Bob had this alternative piece of 
technology we could have used instead of yours. Yours was some increment 
better than his, that is the value you added, because we could have used his 
rather than yours, so your net contribution was that amount. And that’s what 
you should get as a reasonable royalty. 
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successful, and there is nothing about an SDO’s IPR policy or the 
assurance of “fair” compensation that guarantees a positive return on 
investment. All true enough. But in order for the investment to be 
“incentive compatible” – meaning that a rational firm would 
undertake it in the first place61 – the firm must expect the return on its 
investment to be non-negative. In other words, while acknowledging 
the possibility of losing money, a rational firm will only invest if it 
expects to break even or better, on average. The “incremental value” 
rule, as applied in this fashion, does not satisfy that requirement. 
A more thoughtful approach recognizes that R&D is costly, and 
awards 60 to Firm A: 20 (the increment over Firm B’s alternative) 
plus 40 (the increment of Firm B’s alternative over the “no R&D” 
status quo ante). This approach also yields a positive return on R&D 
for Firm A: (60 – 50) / 50 = 20%, the same as it would have received 
under market competition. Surely this is the correct result? Yet this 
“incremental value” approach is also erroneous. 
The reason for the error is that, in the market example, the 
winner takes 60 and the loser takes 40. In a standardized competition, 
the loser takes nothing. In other words, standardization creates 
(complete) losers, as well as (complete) winners. The risk of going 
home empty-handed, instead of with just a modest loss, is something 
that a rational firm must take into account when deciding whether or 
not to invest. Thus if Firm A and Firm B each had a 50% chance of 
winning the R&D competition ex ante, and each spent 50 on R&D, 
then each would have had to expect a reward of at least 100 in the 
event that he won, to offset the 50% chance that he will receive 0: 
50% x 100 + 50% x 0 = 50.  When adjusted for the risk he bore, the 
winner’s realized prize of 100 – a return on his investment of (100 – 
50) / 50 = 100% – only causes him to break even in expectation. If the 
reward were 98, not 100, then the winner would expect to receive 
50% x 98 + 50% x 0 = 49. No rational firm will spend 50 with 
certainty to make 49 on average. 
Put differently, the “incremental benefit” of winning the 
standardization contest is 100 – 0 = 100, not 20 or 60.  Thus, if the 
winner were to receive only 60, based on an ex post calculation of his 
 
61.  An “incentive compatible” economic mechanism is one in which the behavior 
expected of an economic agent is the same as what the agent would choose, acting in its own 
profit-maximizing interests.ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON AND JERRY R. 
GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, 857-925 (1995). 
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invention’s supposed “incremental value,” the winner would, of 
course, still accept the award, and would still “make money.” 60 – 50 
= 10. But this proposed policy is “dynamically inconsistent,” because 
it fails to induce the investment that each competitor actually made. 
Had the competing innovators known, at the time of their original 
investments, that their reward would be 60, then they would have 
only expected to earn 50% x 60 + 50% x 0 = 30, and therefore would 
not have invested 50. In fact, the same is true for any other reward 
limited to the difference in their “market outcomes”: neither firm 
would have made the R&D investment, no innovation would have 
occurred, and there would be nothing to standardize or coordinate. 
Dynamic inconsistency is, therefore, a serious logical error in policy 
design, because it depends on being able to bait investors with the 
promise of a large reward, then switch to a small reward.62 In short, 
the “incremental value” policy depends on changing the rules of the 
game after the innovators have sunk their R&D investments – the 
classic definition of hold-up. 
This is the critical difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2: in 
Figure 1, the technology that is selected into the standard is assumed 
to exist already, so selection into the standard is simply a windfall 
gain to the winner. But in Figure 2, the technology that is selected 
into the standard is the result of a costly R&D competition in which 
there is one winner and many losers – as shown by the fact that, at the 
point in time that the winner is licensing its technology, each loser 
receives “< Nothing >“. For this system to be economically rational, 
the winner’s compensation must pay the cost of everyone’s R&D – 
not just its own. 
The foregoing discussion assumes that the innovative process is 
the same under both market competition and standardization. But 
standardization has other beneficial effects on R&D. Standardization 
 
62.  ”Dynamic inconsistency” results when a decision-maker’s preferences differ at two 
points in time, such that a threat or promise made at one point in time is not credible. For 
example, to induce investment in innovation in period 1, consumers would like to promise to 
pay a reward to an innovator, should the investment be successful. But when the innovation 
actually occurs in period 2, consumers would prefer not to pay the reward. Foreseeing this, the 
innovator will not invest unless consumers can credibly commit to paying a reward in the 
future sufficient to induce the investment today, without reneging. The patent system - which 
enables the innovator to exclude consumers from using the patented invention, unless they pay 
for it - is one example of such a credible commitment.  See Paul Klein, Time Consistency of 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2008). 
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is a winner-take-all tournament. Tournaments encourage high-quality 
competition, which produces spillover gains not completely captured 
by the winner. For example, an exciting, well-played golf tournament 
offering a $1 million prize to the winner attracts a larger audience, 
and is therefore more profitable to its organizers, than a dull, sloppy 
tournament, as would likely occur if the second-place finisher were 
promised $500,000, while the winner were promised $500,000 plus 
$1 for each stroke by which she wins – that is, her gain over the 
“next-best alternative.” 
The standard method for increasing the quality of competition is 
to award a much larger prize to the winner than to the second-place 
finisher: with much at stake, even small performance differences 
translate into large outcome differences, so competitors work hard to 
obtain small advantages. In other words, all competitors work harder, 
making for higher-quality competition, even though only one 
ultimately “takes all.” This phenomenon is observed, not just in 
sporting events, but in labor and other markets, as with competitions 
among senior executives to become the CEO of a company.63 The 
sponsor of the tournament gains from the increased effort that every 
competitor puts into winning, even though only one ultimately wins. 
The same is true of the competition to be selected into a 
standard: the stated goal of the competition is to ensure that the best 
possible invention is adopted into the standard. Tournament 
competition increases the expected quality of each winner selected 
from among the underlying outputs.64 But, just as professional golfers 
are not rewarded based on the number of strokes by which they win, 
tournament-type, winner-take-all competition requires tournament-
type, winner-take-all compensation – not the “incremental value” 
compensation derived from market competition.65 
 
63.  See, e.g., Ellen Byron, P & G Narrows Field For CEO Succession, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/p-g-narrows-field-for-ceo-succession-
1414008126. See also 2016 Executive Compensation--Proctor & Gamble Co., MORNINGSTAR, 
http://insiders.morningstar.com/trading/executive-compensation.action?t=PG.  
64. Under tournament competition, the market-wide improvement represented by the 
winning innovation is the “first order statistic” of distribution of invention quality, relative to 
the second-best alternative.  See generally H. A. DAVID AND H. N. NAGARAJA, ORDER 
STATISTICS (3d ed. 2003). Under market competition, the market-wide average improvement 
is a function of all improvements (that is, all N order statistics) drawn by each of the N market 
competitors, each improvement relative to its next-best alternative. 
65.  It should be noted that nothing in this observation supports hold-up or any other 
excessive royalty award. The point is to support a self-sustaining compensation mechanism, 
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This extended discussion is necessary because FRAND 
arbitrators are likely to be told that computing a standardized 
invention’s “ex ante incremental” value is the only legally and 
economically acceptable method for valuing it.66 In fact, 
standardization eliminates both the “ex ante” and the “incremental” 
elements of the market-based paradigm. The “ex ante incremental” 
method is therefore conceptually incorrect, empirically non-
implementable, dynamically inconsistent, and systematically under-
compensates innovators. Arbitrators should resist entreaties to 
entertain, much less rely on, any such method.67 
Arbitrators should also resist the parallel claims that (a) the only 
thing required of an arbitrator is to calculate a “FRAND rate,” and (b) 
 
under which innovators expect to earn a normal return on their investments. To say that the 
static paradigm fails to provide that support is not to argue for excess in the other direction. 
66.  The idea that a reasonable royalty should reflect the ex ante value of the patented 
technology, over and above the next-best alternative, is far from new. This is the approach 
recommended by the Federal Trade Commission. The European Commission also takes this 
approach. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 603, 616 (2007) (discussing that a patented technology’s ex ante value should reflect a 
reasonable royalty); see also Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and 
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standard Selection, and the Control of Market Power, 
73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 15 (2005) (describing the ex-ante auction model). 
67.  This point has profound antitrust implications. Antitrust policy is based on well-
known definitions of a “relevant market,” “market power” and related concepts.  
To define a relevant antitrust market (which comprises “close [economic] 
substitutes”), one must employ market prices (which form the basis for the 
economic definition of “close substitutes”). But as we have seen, prices are 
irrelevant to the standard selection process, so there is no ex ante price by which to 
identify “close [economic] substitutes.” Similarly, “market power” is “the ability to 
maintain price above the competitive level”; again, prices for technical contributions 
do not exist “ex ante,” so there is necessarily no basis for comparing them to a 
“competitive price level,” and therefore no way to determine whether any given ex 
post price exhibits “market power,” either. And, even if one were to insist that a 
market-based antitrust analysis apply to non-market competition, one must 
distinguish between the (multiple) competitive prices expected under market 
competition (in which those who finish second or lower in the R&D competition 
also participate in the market), – and the (single) winning price expected under 
tournament competition (under which the price for every losing contribution is 
zero). Static antitrust doctrine is unable either to make this distinction conceptually, 
or to measure this benchmark price empirically.   
See generally Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Dept of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission, Aug. 19, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-
08192010 [https://perma.cc/H9PR-XQN8].   
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the calculation of such a rate is “simple.”68 As a purely contractual 
matter, the licensor commits to be prepared to license on “FRAND 
terms and conditions,” not to a “FRAND rate.”69 But because the rate 
depends, logically and economically, on other contract terms, the 
proper comparison of contracts does not permit one to simply 
interpret the rate – or any other contract term – in isolation.70 
This general principle of contract interpretation is true in the 
FRAND context, in particular. In actual contracts that have been 
found to comply with the ETSI FRAND undertaking,71 some of the 
 
68.   See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2 (“If one party argues for a lump sum and the 
other for a running royalty, the arbitrator is choosing between apples and oranges. That makes 
the arbitrator’s job harder, but by no means impossible; she simply must decide which 
approach better reflects what hypothetical negotiators would have chosen in that particular 
instance. If necessary, she can specify the royalty structure (e.g., lump sum vs. running 
royalties, or the royalty base to be used) to facilitate an apples-to-apples comparison of the 
rates proposed by the two parties. Beyond this, we do not think the arbitrator needs to or 
should resolve disputes over other non-price license terms. A FRAND license is by definition 
neither temporally limited nor limited to producing a set number of products; it provides terms 
that apply whenever the licensee makes products implementing the standard during the term of 
the patents.”).  
69.   See ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRS), supra note 12 (“Declarant 
and/or its AFFILIATES are (1) prepared to grant irrevocable licenses under this/these IPR(s) 
on terms and conditions which are in accordance with Clause 6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy”) 
(emphasis supplied).  
70.  The comparison of licenses also occurs outside the FRAND context. For example, 
when one licensee has bargained for terms that are at least as favorable as those granted to any 
other licensee (a so-called “most-favored licensee”), the comparison of terms depends on the 
entire agreement: 
Whether a later license is more favorable thus depends upon the total package of 
consideration flowing both ways, not upon any single rate or term in isolation. The 
standard for evaluating the total package of consideration is an objective one; the 
licensor is not allowed to determine on its own what terms are more favorable. 
Among the things that courts may consider as part of the package are cross-licenses 
under conflicting patents, releases from restraints in litigation, and the licensor’s 
indemnification of later licensees against infringement claims by third parties. The 
scope of the license of course is also important. To the extent consideration can be 
evaluated, courts weigh these and other relevant factors in an attempt to compare the 
net competitive value of later nonexclusive licenses with the net competitive value 
of terms granted the most favored licensee. 
JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 9.02 (2017). While the 
determination of FRAND terms and conditions may also involve the comparison of licenses, it 
is important to emphasize that a licensor’s FRAND undertaking is not a commitment to grant 
most-favored licensee terms or status. 
71. See Certain 3G Mobile Headsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-613 USITC Pub. 4145 (Apr. 
2015) (Remand) (Public Version): 
[InterDigital] has been negotiating with [Respondents Nokia and its successor 
Microsoft Mobile Oy], and in as much as the [R]espondents have not provided 
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determinants of the royalty rate include: the term of the agreement; 
the structure of the contract (fixed or running); the price of the 
licensed product; caps and/or floors on the price of the licensed 
product; the volume of licensed units; the extent to which the royalty 
is pre-paid; the geographic region in which the sale takes place; the 
evolution of the composition of the patent portfolio over time 
(through expirations, acquisitions, divestitures, etc.); and the terms of 
release for past infringing sales. 72 
Because such terms are interdependent, it is not possible to 
exhaustively characterize the matrix of effects resulting from a 
change in one term on each of the other terms. But in Table 1, I have 
suggested the direction that a change in the indicated term might be 
expected to have on “the rate” implicitly or explicitly paid by the 
licensee.  
 
Table 1: The Potential Effects on the FRAND Royalty Rate 
from Changing Non-Rate Contract Terms  
 
Contract 
term or 
condition 
Change in 
contract 
term 
Potential 
effect on 
royalty 
per unit 
Reason 
Contract 
length 
Longer 
contract 
Negative Longer contracts reduce 
uncertainty and 
recontracting costs 
 
evidence of what a FRAND rate would be, and what duties of good faith have 
been violated by InterDigital, there is no evidence that [InterDigital] has 
violated its duty of good faith, or tried for a patent holdup. As was the case in 
the 868 investigation [also involving InterDigital] the evidence presented does 
not support the Respondents’ position that InterDigital has violated a FRAND 
obligation by filing this complaint at the ITC. The negotiation has continued in 
good faith, and there are many more issues than the rate of payment to be 
made, as the evidence presented by both sides has demonstrated. (emphasis 
added).   
72.  This list is not only not exhaustive, but it also does not imply that any individual 
term is or is not “FRAND,” taken on its own. See Dratler, supra note 70 (licenses, like other 
contracts, must be evaluated as a whole).  
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Contract 
structure 
Running to 
fixed 
Negative By committing upfront, 
licensee assumes greater 
risk; no distortion of 
marginal production cost 
Price of 
licensed 
unit 
Higher price Positive If rate is expressed as fixed 
percent of price, payment 
increases 
Price caps No cap to 
cap 
Negative A cap limits the portion of 
price subject to royalty 
Price floors No floor to 
floor 
Positive A floor defines a minimum 
payment regardless of price 
Volume of 
units 
Increase in 
volume 
Negative Volume discounts 
incentivize greater licensed 
sales and royalties 
Pre-
payment 
No 
prepayment 
to some 
Negative Licensee assumes greater 
risk; increases licensor 
capital 
Geographic 
region 
Worldwide 
rate to 
regional 
rates 
Positive/ 
negative 
Regional rates reflect local 
conditions; usually lower in 
Asia 
Evolution 
of portfolio 
size over 
time 
Increase / 
decrease 
Neutral Rates reflect average 
portfolio composition over 
contract term; they are not 
“marked to market” 
Release 
payment 
Larger 
payment for 
past sales 
Negative Past royalty obligations are 
not amortized over future 
sales 
 
The changes and justifications shown in Table 1 are not 
definitive. There may be multiple justifications for any given contract 
term; more generally, the parties may have competing (or 
contradictory) justifications for agreeing to any given term. The point 
is simply to show that, if one is to consider the terms and conditions 
of a real-world license agreement, “the rate” cannot be evaluated in 
isolation from the other terms. 
Because of this complex interdependence among contract terms 
and conditions, it is “simple” to disprove the hypothesis that the 
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computation of a “FRAND rate” is “simple.” On the contrary, the 
comparison of licenses is fraught with ambiguity, precisely because 
the licensor has undertaken to be prepared to grant a license on 
(multi-dimensional) “FRAND terms and conditions,” not a (one-
dimensional) “FRAND rate.” To make matters worse, such 
comparisons must usually be filtered through academic commentary 
divorced from real-world contracts, incompetent (or worse) economic 
testimony, and/or the decisions of prior arbitration panels. The next 
sections explore these difficulties in turn. 
III. INTRA-ARBITRATION ANALYSIS OF LICENSES 
While the licensing of standardized patents can take many forms, 
one archetypal license structure is the “cross-license with balancing 
payment,” or a “fixed-payment cross-license.” Such licenses are 
common when the overarching objective of each party is to ensure the 
“freedom to operate,” by avoiding all sources of patent conflict 
between the parties. This objective is common to the FRAND context, 
but it is not limited to that context.73 
In fixed-payment cross-licenses, each party grants to the other 
blanket permission to a set of its patents: “all patents”; “all patents 
essential to implement standard X in product Y”; etc. The license may 
cover a fixed time period, or it may extend to the life of the patents. 
The license generally does not enumerate the licensed patents. In the 
context of a license to “standard-essential patents” subject to a 
FRAND obligation, this means that any given patent may or may not 
be licensed, depending on whether it does or does not meet the 
definition of an “essential” patent under the SDO’s IPR policy.74 
 
73. Peter C. Grindley and David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and 
Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, CALIFORNIA MGMT. REV. 39 (1997) 
(explaining that because of the potential for mutually blocking patents, firms employing 
“cumulative technologies” typically cross-license all patents in a field-of-use to ensure 
adequate access, or “freedom to operate”; the strongest examples of cumulative technologies 
are computers and semiconductors). 
74.  This is just one of the reasons why patent damages law is sometimes ill-suited to 
guide a FRAND arbitration. In a patent damages case, an individual patent is assumed valid 
and infringed. In looking to “comparable licenses,” however, the trier of fact not only does not 
find a license that priced the individual asserted patent (because prior licenses generally are 
portfolio licenses), but cannot even determine whether the asserted patent was licensed at all 
in the prior licenses (because the prior licenses made the license grant conditional on a finding 
of essentiality, a finding that generally has not been made one way or the other). 
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Critically, fixed-payment licenses also do not contain a “rate” of 
any kind. The only “economic term” is a fixed payment from one 
party to the other. In a cross-license, that fixed payment reflects the 
parties’ agreed estimate of the net of each party’s aggregate claim on 
the other. Licensed patents, royalty rates, units sold – none of these 
are to be found in the archetypical agreement. For an arbitrator or 
other “rate-setter” whose ostensible task is to determine a “FRAND 
royalty rate” – leaving aside the question of how that “rate” interacts 
with the contract’s other terms and conditions – the empirical 
question is how to infer the “rate” implied by each such rate-less 
agreement. 
A. Contractual Indeterminacy 
To fix these ideas, and to illustrate the difficulties the arbitrator 
faces, it is helpful to employ a simple example. Suppose that the 
arbitrator wishes to interpret a fixed-payment cross-license entered 
into between two firms, 1 and 2. The only economic term in the 
contract is that “Firm 1 shall pay Firm 2 $1.” 
A natural first step in the analysis of this agreement is to 
determine the respective licensed sales of the parties; presumably, 
these quantities helped determine the claim that each party made on 
the other. For simplicity, I assume that these quantities are known 
with certainty: Firm 1 sells $200 of licensed units, while Firm 2 sells 
$100. Having larger sales, Firm 1 is said to have the larger “royalty 
exposure.” That fact helps explain why, in the actual agreement, Firm 
1 pays $1 to Firm 2. 
As Table 2 shows, however, knowing each party’s sales plus the 
$1 balancing payment from Firm 1 to Firm 2 is not sufficient to 
determine either party’s claim on the other – nor is it sufficient to 
infer the implied “rate” per dollar of sales.  
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Table 2: The Same Balancing Payment Implies Multiple 
Combinations of Rates  
 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Firm 2’s 
claim  
   
Firm 1’s 
sales 
$200 $200 $200 
Firm 2’s 
rate 
3% 1.5% 0.5% 
1 owes 2 $6 $3 $1 
Firm 1’s 
claim  
   
Firm 2’s 
sales 
$100 $100 $100 
Firm 1’s 
rate 
5% 2% 0% 
2 owes 1 $5 $2 $0 
Balancing 
payment 
from 1 to 
2 
$1 $1 $1 
 
The problem illustrated in Table 2 is that there are multiple 
combinations of rates (shown in italics) that could have generated the 
observed net payment between the parties. In fact, there are an infinite 
number of such combinations. Those combinations are given by the 
line in Figure 3. Insofar as the arbitrator is (erroneously) tasked with 
determining a single “FRAND rate,” the question to be resolved is: 
where are the parties on this line? 
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Thus, the irreducible problem with inferring “the rate” from a 
fixed-payment cross-license is indeterminacy: without bringing in 
information from outside the contract, it is impossible to determine 
“the rate(s)” to which the parties (implicitly) agreed within the 
contract. 
B. Private Beliefs 
In the prior example, indeterminacy arose even though we 
assumed that market conditions were known with certainty. Of 
course, in the real world the parties do not know their future sales 
with certainty. Instead, they form certain beliefs about the future, 
based on their own private information. Those private beliefs may, or 
may not, coincide with the beliefs formed by others, based on public 
information. As a classic example, Apple knew the attributes of the 
iPhone before its launch, but its counter-parties did not know these 
attributes. Among those who predicted failure, or at best limited 
success, for the iPhone were the chief executive officers of Microsoft, 
Figure 3 
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Blackberry (Research in Motion), Nokia, Palm, and Motorola.75 Thus 
Apple’s 2007 expectations of future iPhone sales undoubtedly 
differed from those of “the market” (which differed, in turn, among 
market analysts and insiders).76 
In general, parties need not and do not share their private beliefs 
in license negotiations (subject to the general duty to negotiate in 
good faith).77 Thus, when we relax the assumption that future licensed 
sales are known, we immediately confront the question: What were 
the expectations of the parties? To that question, there is usually no 
unambiguous answer.78 
From the fact that the negotiating parties eventually reached 
agreement, one might infer that they shared similar beliefs. But that 
inference is untrue. As Table 3 shows, parties can believe completely 
different things about the future, and yet come to agreement on a 
contract’s only economic term. Again, we assume two firms, but 
 
 75. Kif Leswing, Nine People Who Knew the iPhone Was Going To Be A Flop, 
BUSINESS INSIDER, (June 29, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/9-people-who-knew-the-
iphone-was-going-to-be-a-flop-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/J4BS-BSZZ].  
76.  See id. It should be noted here as well that some “neutral” technology analysts 
thought the iPhone would fail as well.  
77. Sometimes the parties are forbidden from sharing private information, for example 
because they have entered into other agreements that require confidential treatment. In general, 
the confidentiality of such private information, and the asymmetry of information that it 
introduces into license negotiations, are normal and recognized features of commercial 
transactions.  See ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRS),supra note 12 (“It is 
recognized that Non Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) may be used to protect the commercial 
interests of both potential licensor and potential licensee during an Essential IPR licensing 
negotiation, and this general practice is not challenged. Nevertheless, ETSI expects its 
members (as well as non-ETSI members) to engage in an impartial and honest Essential IPR 
licensing negotiation process for FRAND terms and conditions.”). 
78.  Even when a party’s internal documents are discoverable in litigation, they could 
have been prepared with discoverability in mind, and could thus contain “strategic” 
expectations designed to reinforce the party’s expected future legal position, should litigation 
occur. Thus, in addition to trying to determine private beliefs, the finder of fact may also 
confront questions about the sincerity of those beliefs. 
“Sincerity” is not, of course, an economic concept; economic analysis is generally limited 
to determining the extent to which the ex post assertion of an ex ante belief is consistent with 
other ex ante information and expectations. Such determinations sometimes lead to the 
economic inference that a claim is “not credible.” Here, “credibility” does not mean the same 
thing as it does in a courtroom, where credibility determinations belong exclusively to the trier 
of fact. In economics, “credibility” refers to the consistency of a statement or purported course 
of action with the economic agent’s actual interests. For example, to say that a threat to engage 
in a price war is “not credible” is to say that it is not in the interests of the economic agent to 
follow through on the threat.  Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, Credible Threats, (Coase-Sandor 
Institute for Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 692, 2014).   
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focus only on the parties’ beliefs about Firm 1’s sales. Firm 2 must 
rely on public information about Firm 1’s product; based on that 
information, Firm 2 believes that Firm 1 will sell $100. In contrast, 
Firm 1 knows the future attributes of its product; based on that private 
information, Firm 1 believes that it will sell $200. 
With respect to “the rate” to be inferred from the contract, Firm 
2 believes, based on its (private) knowledge of its other licenses, that 
its patents command a royalty rate of 1% of sales. Firm 1, which 
cannot observe these licenses, believes that the royalty rate should be 
0.5%.  
 
Table 3: The Same Royalty Payment Arises From Different 
Beliefs About the Facts 
 
 Firm 1’s belief Firm 2’s belief 
Firm 1’s sales $200 $100 
Firm 2’s royalty 
rate 
0.5% 1% 
1’s agreed royalty 
payment 
$1 $1 
 
As Table 3 shows, even though the parties believe entirely 
different things about the factual determinants of the royalty payment 
(the italicized values), they nevertheless agree on the payment itself. 
And that payment is the only economic term observed in the contract. 
If an arbitrator or other outside observer were to suggest that the 
“FRAND rate” to which the parties agreed were 1%, Firm 1 would 
vehemently disagree; and if the observer suggested the rate were 
0.5%, Firm 2 would vehemently disagree. Thus, when justifying to an 
arbitrator Firm 2’s offer to a third party (“1% of sales”), Firm 2 can 
point to its license with Firm 1 to confirm the “fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory” nature of its offer – an assertion that the other 
party to the same contract would deny. 
It is also important to note that Firm 2’s beliefs may have been 
legitimate, based on the information it had available at the time, but 
that those beliefs subsequently turned out to be wrong, while Firm 1’s 
were correct. Thus suppose that, in the event, Firm 1 sells $200, for 
which Firm 2 receives a $1 royalty. It is tempting to argue that the 
“effective rate” of Firm 2’s patent portfolio is $1 / $200 = 0.5% – and 
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that the same “true effective rate” should be given to others as well. 
But that argument is wrong: it imports into the inference information 
about the future (Firm 1’s actual sales) that neither party possessed at 
the time of the negotiation. Just as it is conceptually wrong to infer 
the “correct” insurance premium that should have been paid for a fire 
insurance policy from the (unknown, future) fact that the insured’s 
house actually did not burn down, it is conceptually wrong to infer the 
“correct” royalty rate for a licensor’s technology from the (unknown, 
future) fact of the licensee’s actual sales.79 
As the next section illustrates, the “economic analysis” of 
standard-essential patent licenses is rife with these and other such 
abuses. 
C. Summary 
Two of the most important parameters of a patent license are the 
structure (fixed payment or running royalty) and direction (one-way 
or two-way) of its payments. The possible combinations of these 
parameters are shown in the grid of Figure 4 below. The simplest 
license, from the point of view of inferring a rate, is a running royalty 
payment from a licensor to a licensee: “Firm 1 pays Firm 2 1% of 
sales.” Such a license is shown in the upper-left quadrant of the grid. 
In contrast, a “fixed payment cross-license” – the most common form 
of a standard-essential patent license, in which “Firm 1 pays Firm 2 
$1” – occupies the lower-right quadrant of this grid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79.  Such inferences are also inevitably opportunistic. If instead of selling $200, Firm 1 
had sold $50, the same calculation leads to an implied “effective rate” of $1 / $50 = 2%. 
Needless to say, no third party would advocate that it should pay Firm 2’s “true effective rate” 
of 2%, when Firm 2 itself has offered a rate of 1%. Here, as elsewhere, third parties who 
advocate the use of information that was unavailable to the contracting parties at the time they 
contracted do so selectively, in an effort to bias inferences in their favor. Again, arbitrators 
should firmly resist such attempts (except to the extent that future events can be shown to 
confirm the beliefs that a party held, based on the information it actually possessed, at the time 
of contracting). 
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For cross-licenses, the fundamental inferential problem for 
outside observers is indeterminacy: there are an infinite number of 
possible rates that give rise to the observed payment. For fixed-
payment agreements, the fundamental inferential problem for outside 
observers is private beliefs: each party contracts based on its 
expectations about the future, but those expectations need not be 
shared or even observable. Inferences from a fixed-payment cross-
license are afflicted by both these problems. 
In short, as Figure 4 shows, from the point of view of drawing 
reliable inferences about the “FRAND rate,” we most frequently find 
ourselves in the worst of all worlds: trying to interpret contract terms 
that imply, on one hand, an infinite number of mutually acceptable 
“rates,” and, on the other, contradictions producing zero mutually 
acceptable “rates.” 
In the face of these difficulties, parties unsurprisingly enlist the 
help of economic experts to persuade arbitrators of the correctness of 
their economic positions. But unless those experts recognize these 
fundamental problems, they are doomed to make the situation worse, 
not better. That is, unfortunately, the most frequent outcome. 
Figure 4: Patent License Payment Structures and Directions 
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IV. ECONOMIC TESTIMONY IN FRAND ARBITRATIONS 
Tolstoy observed that “Happy families are all alike; every 
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”80 
Like unhappy families, each “unhappy” economic testimony 
exhibits its own idiosyncratic failings and abuses. Thus, there can be 
no systematic way to warn prophylactically against such errors. What 
follows is an effort to categorize some of the more easily recognized 
and frequent abuses. 
A. “Effective” Rates 
1. Comparing Contractual with Non-contractual Terms 
As the preceding section illustrated, it can be difficult or 
impossible to infer a “rate” from a contract in which a “rate” does not 
appear. But that fact does not prevent economists from trying to 
“assist the court” by creating “rates” where they do not exist. The 
name typically given to such creations – an “effective rate” – carries 
an almost irresistible pull, as though it should tell the observer 
something about the “true rate.” More often than not, that claim is 
false. 
First, as Figure 4 shows, a contract in which the parties have 
bargained for a rate is fundamentally different from a contract in 
which the parties have not struck such a bargain. In a contract having 
a rate, the licensee commits to pay an amount per unit; units are an 
essential term of the contract. In a contract not having such a rate, the 
licensee commits to paying a fixed amount; the number of units is 
irrelevant. Thus, a contract in which the licensee pays $1 per unit and 
is expected to sell 100 units is fundamentally different from a contract 
in which the licensee pays $100 and can sell as many units as it 
pleases. The risks, cost structure, liquidity requirements, and effect on 
price of the two contracts are different; the economics are different. 
No amount of calculations by an economic expert can convert one 
type of contract into the other.81 
 
80. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (1878). 
81. Lucent Technologies, 580 F.3d at 1325-32 (discussing at length the relevant legal 
and economic differences between running royalty and fixed-payment contracts).   
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Yet, despite their extensive training in the drafting and 
interpretation of contracts, including the often-adversarial process of 
selecting a unique combination of terms that satisfies both parties and 
that trades off one party's concerns against the other’s, lawyers, 
judges and other neutrals are (in the author’s experience) often easily 
convinced that there ought to be some mathematical way to compare 
the “economic terms” of two contracts, using a single number. The 
invitation to abandon settled principles of contract interpretation 
(requiring that terms be evaluated jointly), in favor of an economist’s 
reductionist, one-dimensional calculation, is often hard to resist, at 
least for the mathematically untrained. Resistance is even more 
difficult when there exists a legal norm like “non-discrimination,” 
which seems virtually to require that such one-dimensional 
comparisons be made, to establish or refute a claim of discrimination. 
Example 1. To see how matters can go wrong, consider the ways 
that some economists handle the comparison of running royalty and 
fixed-payment contracts. Licensee A, who agrees to a $1 per unit 
royalty, owes $200 if sells 200 units; the contractual rate is $1/unit. 
Licensee B, who agrees to a fixed payment of $100, owes $100 if it 
sells 100 units, or 200 units; there is no contractual rate. However, in 
the event that sales are 200 units, an economist may compute an 
“effective rate” of $100 / 200 = $0.50 per unit. He then compares B’s 
agreement to A’s, and argues that B’s contract exhibits a “lower rate.” 
But that argument is erroneous: the economist is comparing a 
contractual term, for which the parties bargained, with a non-
contractual term, invented by the economist. Thus, the first analytical 
error is “comparing the contracts” by comparing contractual with 
non-contractual terms. 
A related, but conceptually distinct point is this: if one assumes 
that each licensee sells 200 units, then Licensee B received the lower 
“effective rate.” If instead one assumes that each licensee sells 50 
units, then Licensee A received the lower “effective rate.” But these 
comparisons depend on knowing the actual number of units that will 
be sold – a fact that the parties did not know when they contracted. 
Thus, the second analytical error is comparing the contracts using 
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hindsight, by imputing to the parties information about the future that 
they did not have.82 
2. Example: Price Caps 
Once one discovers how to compute non-contractual “effective 
rates” and to compare them with contractual rates, the potential for 
mischief is virtually unlimited. For example, consider the common 
practice of including “caps” on royalty payments. One justification 
for a cap is that the licensed device (such as a smartphone) contains 
components (such as a diamond-studded case) whose value is 
unrelated to the licensed technology. The licensee argues that it 
should not pay a royalty on that portion of the device price “above” 
the portion attributable to the licensed technology. 
Example 2. To implement a cap, the parties agree to a maximum 
payment per unit, regardless of its price: for example, “1% of price 
subject to a cap of $2 per unit.” In this case, the royalty payment 
increases smoothly until the price of the licensed unit reaches $200, at 
which point it reaches the cap; no further payment is required on that 
unit. Suppose that Licensee A sells a device priced at $300, and 
agrees to these “rate + cap” terms. Then, because the cap is binding, 
its payment will be $2 per unit – an “effective rate” of $2 / $300 = 
0.67%. Suppose Licensee B also agrees to a 1% contractual rate with 
a $2 cap – the same contract. But Licensee B sells a device priced at 
$150. In that case, because the cap is not binding, the “effective rate” 
is $1.50 / $150 = 1%. An economist comparing “effective rates” will 
conclude that Licensee B has suffered “discrimination” because it 
pays at a higher “effective rate” – even though both parties negotiated 
the exact same terms. Again, this comparison and conclusion are 
erroneous: the difference in “effective rate” is not due to differential 
treatment by the licensor, but to differential behavior by the licensee. 
Example 3. In more complex and realistic contracts, the potential 
for abuse worsens. Consider the case in Figure 5, which generalizes 
the “cap” example slightly by allowing each firm to sell two types of 
handsets, a high-price handset (at $400), and a low-price handset (at 
$100). Each firm sells 100 units. They differ only in the mix of 
 
82.  Again, if the “information from the future” is an accurate proxy for the expectations 
of a party at the time of contracting, then this potential distortion may be eliminated.  But the 
question remains:  if  private expectations differ, which party’s expectations are controlling? 
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handsets they sell: Licensee A sells mostly low-price units, while 
Licensee B sells mostly high-price units. But they also negotiate 
different license terms: Licensee A pays royalties at the rate of 1.25% 
of sales, subject to a $2 cap, while Licensee B pays at the rate of 2% 
of sales, subject to a $3 cap. 
 
 
One might easily infer that Licensee B’s terms are “worse” than 
Licensee A’s: both its per-unit royalty rate and its per-unity royalty 
cap are higher. Yet, as Figure 5 shows, a comparison of their 
“effective rates” rejects this conclusion: because Licensee B sells a 
different mix of handsets, its “effective rate” is 0.83% – significantly 
less than the 1% “effective rate” paid by Licensee A. 
The immediate lesson here is that “effective rates” are not only 
“not effective” for making one-dimensional comparisons between 
multi-dimensional contracts, but their use actively misleads the trier 
of fact, typically by suggesting discrimination where it does not exist. 
Economists who know this technique routinely abuse it; arbitrators 
believe them at their peril.  
But the larger point is this: negotiating firms usually know their 
interests. Their decisions, particularly the contractual terms to which 
Figure 5: “Worse” Terms Yield a “Better Effective Rate” 
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they agree, generally should be relied upon as an indication of what is 
“fair” and “reasonable,” absent compelling evidence to the contrary, 
because they have better information about their contemporaneous 
interests and beliefs than does an ex post trier of fact.83   
The general principle – that contracts must be compared based 
on all of their terms, not on a single, non-contractual “effective rate” – 
should be uncontroversial. But FRAND litigants and their economic 
experts routinely flout it, both in litigation and in arbitration. Such 
attempts should be shut down before being evaluated on the merits, 
because they are legally erroneous. 
For example, in Certain Wireless Devices,84 the respondents 
argued that complainant InterDigital had violated its FRAND 
commitment by discriminating against them, based on an analysis of 
the ostensible “effective rates” that the respondents calculated from 
InterDigital’s licenses. On the merits, no such discrimination was 
found. But as a threshold legal matter, the administrative law judge 
rejected the claim that such comparisons should be made at all: 
The FRAND nondiscrimination requirement prohibits “unfair 
discrimination,” but it does not require uniform treatment across 
licensees, nor does it require the same terms for every 
manufacturer or competitor. Respondents base their argument 
that InterDigital’s license offers are discriminatory on their 
calculation of the “effective royalty rate” of the offers. A 
nondiscrimination analysis, however, requires an examination of 
the whole of each license agreement, and not just the effective 
royalty rate.85 
 
83.  The U.S. Supreme Court has defined “fair market value” as “the price at which the 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under 
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.” See 
United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973) (observing that “[t]he willing buyer-
willing seller test of fair market value is nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gifts 
taxes themselves.”). 
Fair market value is, in other words, the price observed in a (1) voluntary, (2) informed, 
(3) arm’s length (4) exchange. Accounting and financial standards rely on the same principles, 
as does the U.S. Treasury. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 157 40-45 (2006); Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (1959) 
(adopting Cartwright verbatim); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965). 
84.   See Certain Wireless Devices With 3G Capabilities, Inv. No. 337-TA-800 (June 
28, 2013) (Public Version).  
85.  Id. at 432 (internal citations omitted). 
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Similar comparisons are routinely made between existing 
contracts, or between contracts and offers, involving volume 
discounts, regional royalty rates, released (past) sales and expected 
(future) sales, and similar contractual terms. In each case, the 
arbitrator is urged to forego the actual terms of the contract in favor of 
the non-contractual calculations of the economist.  In each case, that 
suggestion leads to error.   
B. “Comparable” Licenses 
These errors extend naturally to the choice of contracts that are 
employed for comparison. A contract that is alleged to be 
“comparable” for FRAND purposes is, in reality, selected by the 
economist because its terms can be manipulated to produce a more 
favorable “effective rate.” In the FRAND context, the possibility of 
this kind of strategic manipulation of the evidence by the expert 
exacerbates the intrinsic difficulties posed by the indeterminacy and 
private beliefs reflected in any individual agreement. 
An arbitrator can sometimes, as in Example 2, diagnose such 
errors by applying the terms of an allegedly superior contract to the 
circumstances of the supposedly disadvantaged licensee, and 
comparing the licensee's total payment under each set of terms. As in 
Example 2 (where the terms of the “better” contract were identical to 
those of the “worse” contract), this procedure can verify that the 
contracts are non-discriminatory, by holding constant the licensee’s 
conduct and circumstances, and isolating the effects of the contract 
terms themselves. 
C. The Downward “Non-Discriminatory” Spiral 
When relying on one or more “comparable” agreements for 
FRAND comparisons, economic experts frequently misinterpret and 
misapply the terms, to generate proposals for “equivalent” licenses 
that are economically and competitively unlike the agreements on 
which they rely. This procedure has the effect of ensuring that 
discrimination occurs – but in favor of the prospective licensee. 
In the FRAND context, a particularly common and pernicious 
strategic manipulation of “effective rates” is the inconsistent 
treatment of running royalties. Such royalties are typically expressed 
either as a percentage of price, or a fixed royalty per unit. As long as 
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licensees differ in their prices, one of these expressions can always be 
manipulated to produce a better “effective rate.” 
For example, suppose that the licensor’s benchmark agreement 
is a contract with Licensee A that defines the royalty as “1% of sales.” 
Suppose that A has an average selling price of US$100, and so pays 
an “effective rate” of US$1 per unit. B, a prospective licensee with an 
average selling price of US$200, compares (1) the payment implied 
by A’s actual contract term (1% of US$200 = US$2 per unit) with (2) 
A’s “effective rate” (US$1 per unit), then demands the lesser of the 
two, arguing that anything else violates the licensor’s FRAND 
undertaking not to discriminate. The licensor (or an arbitrator or other 
“FRAND rate-setter”) then accedes to B’s demand. Seeing the 
licensor acquiesce to B, prospective Licensee C, whose average 
selling price is US$50, makes a similar comparison: (1) pay at B’s 
US$1 per unit actual contract term, or (2) pay at B’s “effective rate” 
of $1 / US$200 = 0.5%. Again invoking the licensor’s FRAND 
commitment, C demands and receives “the same” 0.5% “effective 
rate” for itself, which results in a payment of 0.5% x US$50 = $0.25. 
Observing C’s deal, prospective Licensee D, whose average selling 
price is US$100 (the same as that of benchmark Licensee A), once 
again compares (1) the payment implied by C’s actual contract term 
(0.5% x US$100 = $0.50), with (2) C’s “effective rate” (US$0.25 per 
unit), and demands and receives “the same” “effective rate” for itself. 
The resulting “effective rate” – US$0.25 / US$100 = 0.25%) – is, of 
course, one-fourth the rate paid by Licensee A –  even though 
Licensee D sells at exactly the same price. 
The success of this strategic manipulation lies in swapping out 
the actual form of the rate found in each benchmark contract 
(percentage or per-unit) in favor of the “effective rate” expressed in 
the other form (per-unit or percentage) – thereby gutting each 
contract’s actual term. Across multiple licensees, this process results 
in a persistent, immutable decline in the rates actually paid – the 
“downward non-discriminatory spiral.” The central error lies in 
permitting each successive licensee to deviate from the express terms 
of the prior contract to improve its position, via an “effective rate,” by 
invoking the “non-discrimination” provision of the licensor’s FRAND 
undertaking. 
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This same downward spiral is generated by demands for other 
types of concessions: volume discounts;86 fixed versus running 
royalty structures; and so on. Each licensee claims to want nothing 
more than “the same” deal as that negotiated by a prior licensee, yet 
the downward spiral ensues because licensees sometimes take account 
of price, volume or other differences between themselves and other 
licensees (“conditional uniform treatment”), and at other times ignore 
such differences (“unconditional uniform treatment”). The demand 
for non-discrimination, inconsistently applied, consistently causes 
discrimination to result. 
While not applicable on the whole to FRAND licensing, the law 
of most-favored licensee (“MFL”) clauses is informative as to how to 
analyze allegations of discrimination in the FRAND context.87 The 
law requires an MFL licensee to accept both the good and the bad 
terms of a benchmark contract, rather than allowing the licensee to: 
cherry-pick only the helpful provisions of the contract (or not meet all 
of its conditions); choose individual provisions from multiple 
contracts; or fabricate fictional “effective” terms that are not, in fact, 
found in any contract at all.88 
By adhering to this principle, arbitrators can reduce, if not 
eliminate, this kind of error when enforcing the actual language of an 
SEP owner’s FRAND undertaking:  ensure that a FRAND licensee 
receives only the entire package of “FRAND terms,” not just a 
“FRAND rate” – and only after meeting the entire package of 
“FRAND conditions” that are actually found in a “comparable 
agreement.”89 
 
86.  For example, large licensee B demands a volume discount (0.75%) relative to small 
licensee A (1%) (claiming that the failure to account for B’s larger sales volume constitutes 
“discrimination”); small licensee C demands “the same” rate as B (0.75%) (claiming that 
taking account of differences in sales volume constitutes discrimination); large licensee D 
demands a volume discount (0.5%) relative to C (citing B); etc. 
87.  To the best of my knowledge, no court has held that a licensor’s FRAND 
undertaking implies MFL treatment. If a licensee wants MFL treatment, that term must be 
made express in the license. 
88.   Dratler, supra note 70 at §9.04 (holding that “where the license containing the 
[MFL] clause and later licenses differ significantly in terms or conditions, the most favored 
licensee cannot pick and choose among them, but must accept the good terms and conditions 
with the bad. If terms besides the royalty rate are changed, the favored licensee cannot receive 
the more favorable rate without also accepting any less favorable terms.”). 
89.  See id.  While the need to adhere to the “entire package of terms and conditions” 
should be uncontroversial in principle, it may not be easy to enforce in practice. As the 
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D. Other Structural Biases 
1. The Alleged Upward Bias in Royalty Rates 
It is, of course, not the job of an individual finder of fact to 
engage in systemic reform. Yet the supposed need for such reform is 
implicit in the static standardization narrative, which uniformly warns 
against supra-normal royalties resulting from the specter of hold-up. 
While not explicitly arguing for systemic reform, individual 
litigants often hypothesize systemic bias when characterizing the data 
available to any given fact-finder.90 Because of the systemic threat of 
hold-up, so goes the argument, actual license agreements are afflicted 
with an upward (that is, licensor-favoring) bias in the observed terms 
and conditions, despite the licensor’s obligation – and the awareness 
of all prior licensees of that obligation – to be prepared to grant a 
license on FRAND terms and conditions. To the prospective licensee 
 
“downward non-discriminatory spiral” example shows, even the simplest contract term, such 
as a percentage-of-price royalty rate, can be recharacterized to mean something different to a 
subsequent licensee if (say) the subsequent licensee’s price is different. Thus the benchmark 
contractual term, “1% of sales” is not usually accompanied by a parallel benchmark condition, 
“as long as you are selling at a price of $100,” chiefly because such conditions restrict the 
ability of the licensee to alter its price, and force the parties to contract over contingencies that 
are irrelevant to their own agreement. But when the benchmark term “1% of sales” is applied 
to a subsequent licensee whose price is $200, the subsequent licensee can then argue that the 
benchmark contract did not contain any “price condition,” so it would be wrong to read that 
condition into the benchmark contract when applying it to the subsequent licensee. Therefore, 
goes the argument, the “true” “effective rate” of the benchmark contract is $1 per unit, not 1% 
[= $2] per unit. 
Similar facts that may have informed the parties’ expectations and impacted the 
contractual rate, but that may not themselves have constituted an explicit condition of the 
benchmark license, could include: the volume of licensed sales; the location of sales; product 
attributes; complementary business relationships; a cross-license; the potential list is long. The 
absence of an explicit condition in the benchmark contract means that arbitrators should be 
especially cautious in applying the terms of a “comparable” agreement to a subsequent 
licensee, which has the incentive both to emphasize favorable contractual terms while ignoring 
unfavorable factual dissimilarities, and/or to emphasize factual similarities while ignoring 
unfavorable contractual terms. 
Of course, licensors have the opposite incentives, and may make similarly selective 
arguments using “comparable” agreements. But FRAND licensors, unlike licensees, have 
already contracted not to discriminate against licensees; under contemporary readings of the 
FRAND undertaking, licensees are beneficiaries of that contract, but have not themselves 
contracted, with respect to discrimination or otherwise. 
90. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2; Joseph Kattan and Chris Wood, Standard-
Essential Patents and the Problem of Hold-Up, (Dec. 19, 2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2370113 [https://perma.cc/C3QH-695L]. 
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who wishes to avoid accepting the same terms as the existing 
licensees, this supposed bias contaminates all the prior contracts 
available to the fact-finder, no matter how consistent their terms. 
Thus, without explicitly demanding or justifying systemic reform, the 
prospective licensee indicts both “the system” and the negotiations 
conducted under it, discounting or eliminating the evidentiary value 
of the contracts produced in the instant proceedings. It follows that 
the only “fair” outcome is to implicitly repudiate these prior 
agreements, and to construct a brand-new set of “fair” terms and 
conditions.91 
As an empirical matter, the proof of such bias would require the 
proof of some benchmark true value for a variable like the “FRAND 
rate,” coupled with evidence that the observed value of the variable 
deviates systematically from that benchmark. For example, the proof 
of upward bias in royalty rates might be made via an economic model 
demonstrating that, absent the systemic threat of hold-up, industry 
royalty rates would be 10% lower. Such a proof would clearly 
establish the true royalty level, and measure the degree of bias 
observed relative to that level. 
If offered, such proof would present the fact-finder with a 
difficult choice: whether to award “FRAND terms and conditions” 
that conform to prior agreements (on non-discrimination grounds) or 
whether to adjust the terms downward to remove the effects of bias 
evident in those prior agreements (on fairness grounds). But, however 
it might be resolved, each horn of that dilemma would have the 
advantage of having been grounded in fact and empirically supported. 
The problem is that there is no such economic model of “hold-up 
bias.”  No economist has ever purported to measure the “percentage 
of upward bias” resulting from the residual “threat of hold-up” that 
ostensibly persists despite every licensor’s universal FRAND 
commitment. The assertion of such bias is a fiction, conveniently 
unprovable, used to undermine the reliability of prior license 
agreements, permitting the licensee to seek fresh, “unbiased” terms 
from the fact-finder. 
 
91. See generally TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. v. 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson , No. SAVC 14-00341 JVS, (C.D. Cal. 2017); In re 
Innovatio, 921 F.Supp.2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013).  
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2. Evidence of Systemic “Upward Bias” 
One important reason why economists have not measured the 
“degree of upward bias” resulting from the “threat of hold-up” is that, 
despite widespread warnings from antitrust agencies and academics, 
economists have never observed, and courts have never found, an 
actual instance of hold-up by a telecommunications firm subject to a 
FRAND commitment.92 
In International Trade Commission Inv. No. 337-TA-613 
(Remand), the administrative law judge once again confronted the 
assertion that hold-up is a pervasive, systemic problem (an assertion 
made in prior investigations involving similar parties and facts).93 The 
ALJ reviewed the evidence for this assertion exhaustively. For 
example: 
There is no evidence presented in this case that patent hold-up is 
a problem in the telecommunication industry.  The Telecom-
munication Industry Association (TIA) in a June 11, 2011 
response to the FTC’s request for comments . . . stated that: “TIA 
has never received any complaints regarding such ‘patent hold-
up’ and does not agree that ‘patent holdup’ is plaguing the 
information and telecommunications technology (ICT) standard 
development processes.”94 
The FTC also made other comments that have been brought to 
the attention of the ALJ in this matter, such as “The FTC has 
recognized that the risk of patent ‘[h]old-up in the standard 
setting context can be particularly acute.’” Once more, however, 
the FTC provides no data that would demonstrate such holdup is 
occurring. Respondents also cite to the FTC comments in [ITC 
Inv. No.] 337-TA-745 which provided a similar concern that 
hold-up was a possibility if an exclusion order were to issue. 
Respondents did not note that the FTC took no position as to 
whether that had happened in the case, and have not found a 
hold-up in any case since.95 
 
92.  Of course, courts have awarded royalty rates lower than those requested by a 
licensor. But disagreement over the correct rate is not per se evidence of hold-up, as that term 
is actually defined. 
93.   See Certain Wireless Devices With 3G Cap Capabilities, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-
800 (Jun. 28, 2013) (Public Version). 
94.  See Certain 3G Mobile Headsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-613, USITC Pub. 4145 (Apr. 
2015) (Remand) at 63-64.  
95.  See id. at 60 (internal citations omitted). 
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In 337-TA-868, the ALJ found little reason to give weight to the 
agencies’ comments, as they were speculative as to what could 
happen, and did not provide any evidence that holdup had 
occurred. There is now even more reason to give little weight to 
the concerns voiced by the FTC and DOJ/PTO in these letters.96 
The ALJ went so far as to query Microsoft’s economist, a 
published advocate of the “standard FRAND paradigm,” on the 
empirical evidence for hold-up: 
The ALJ asked Dr. Shampine if he could cite even one solid 
example of a holdup resulting in a non-FRAND contract. Dr. 
Shampine replied, “We do not have a solid example of that 
occurring yet.”97 
Finally, the ALJ noted that Microsoft’s assertion that hold-up 
was a systemic problem appeared to be opportunistic, being belied by 
its prior submission to the FTC: 
The notion that patent hold-up is a substantial problem that 
should be addressed by government action seems to stem from a 
largely theoretical analysis of the situation . . . 
We believe that there is an important difference between 
intentional or deceptive conduct in connection with patents that 
read on standards and routine bilateral disagreements over 
licensing terms for the use of patented technology. 
In the former context, there seems to be a dearth of examples of 
actual patent hold-up with regard to the essential patent claims 
reading on a standard. Microsoft has never been accused of 
patent hold-up in this regard, nor has it accused any other 
company of such behavior.98 
In short, the ALJ found that: 
In that time [since the FTC’s initial inquiry into hold-up], the IP 
community has been vigilant and has kept a watchful eye on the 
ITC to ensure that patent holdup was not occurring. The result 
has been not a single case of holdup has been noted. Not one 
witness in this hearing was able to provide a single example of a 
holdup due to an exclusion order, or potential exclusion order. 
After watching for a holdup since 2011, we may be able to 
 
96.  See id. at 61. 
97.  See id. at 45. 
98.  See id. at 64-65 (quoting Letter from Microsoft to the Federal Trade Commission 
(June 14, 2011) (emphasis supplied in the Initial Determination). 
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consider whether the fact none has occurred allows us to discount 
the risk today.99 
Despite this absence of evidence, claims that the “threat of hold-
up” has distorted the terms observed in all prior licenses feature 
pervasively in “FRAND rate”-setting proceedings, even today. 
3. Downward bias 
As explained above, licensors confront the symmetric problem 
of “holdout” by prospective licensees. Holdout means delay, perhaps 
indefinitely, in the payment of royalties for standard-essential patents. 
Unlike hold-up, which remains unobserved and for which no 
testable models or empirical measures exist, holdout has been defined 
and proved in court,100 and can be modeled and measured relatively 
easily as a reduction in marginal cost.101 While the mathematics are 
somewhat complex, the intuition is simple: by holding out, a firm 
obtains a cost advantage over a competitor who is licensed. That cost 
advantage translates into a competitive advantage: a larger market 
share for the unlicensed firm, and a smaller market share for the 
licensed firm. Given the standard relationship between price and cost, 
the holdout firm’s cost advantage also translates into a price 
advantage, forcing the licensed firm to reduce its price as well. Thus, 
by increasing the holdout firm’s market share, and reducing industry 
prices, holdout increases the share of unlicensed sales, and reduces 
both the number of units and the prices of licensed sales. Both effects 
reduce the royalties actually received by the licensor. 
By taking market share from the licensed firm, the holdout firm 
introduces a third effect. A firm that chooses to license in the 
presence of holdout by a third party does so despite its recognition 
that it will be placed at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, as an 
inducement to enter into a license, the licensing firm will demand a 
lower royalty rate, to reduce the degree of that disadvantage. In other 
words, holdout by unlicensed firms puts downward pressure on the 
 
99.  See id. at 61. 
100. See id. at 66 (”[The] evidence in this case supports a finding that [Microsoft] 
engaged in reverse holdup or holdout.”). 
101.  Jonathan Putnam et al., Holdout Games (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author).   
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rates to which licensed firms will actually agree. Again, the result is 
to bias downwards the royalties actually received by the licensor. 
Given the confidentiality of license agreements, it is difficult to 
measure precisely the extent of this bias on a global basis.102 But in an 
individual arbitration, in which both the licensor’s and the licensee’s 
prior agreements have been admitted into evidence, the fact-finder 
may ask an important diagnostic question: for what share of the 
industry’s standard-essential patents is the licensee currently paying 
royalties to the holders of SEPs? The answer to that question helps to 
identify the actual degree of downward bias in the licensee’s cost and 
price, and thus the extent to which royalty payments based on the 
licensee's price under-compensate the licensor. 
One may well ask why “the system” permits these distortions to 
occur. The simple answer is that SSOs permit implementers to 
implement a standard without any binding commitment to pay for 
patented technology embodied in the standard. The owners of the 
patented technology must instead identify each implementer and, if 
necessary, prove infringement.103 This “catch me if you can” 
approach to an essential input is inherently inefficient and chaotic: 
one can imagine the results if airlines were permitted to fly without 
paying for jet fuel until “approached” by a fuel vendor. Of course, 
commercial contracts foreclose this possibility, either by demanding 
payment up front or by ensuring that claims for purchases paid in 
arrears are simply and universally enforceable. 
Such systemic, procedural weaknesses must, of course, be 
addressed systemically. The putative setter of a “FRAND rate” cannot 
solve this problem unilaterally. For present purposes, the point is this: 
when confronted with unprovable claims of “upward bias” in the rates 
found in the licensor’s existing licenses, arbitrators and other 
“FRAND rate”-setters should resist the temptation to engage in 
“systemic reform” on behalf of either party, while noting that, to the 
 
102. See Jonathan D. Putnam & Tim A. Williams, The Smallest Salable Patent-
Practicing Unit (SSPPU): Theory and Evidence 55 (2016) (manuscript at Table 1), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835617 [https://perma.cc/ZJK8-CD4A] 
(summarizing publicly available evidence on license agreements among some major telecom 
standard-essential patentees and licensees).   
103. INTERIM REPORT OF THE UMTS IPR WORKING GROUP (1998) (articulating the 
rationale that the value of the ETSI IPR Policy is that the complex commercial issues of the 
details of licenses and of compensation therefore, are placed where they belong, at the center 
of bilateral negotiations between licensor and licensee). 
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extent that the licensee’s price is biased downwards by holdout 
(against the licensor and/or third parties), the licensor will not be fully 
compensated even by a “FRAND rate” expressed as a percentage of 
that price. 
V. SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF ARBITRATION PANEL DECISIONS 
A. The Persistent Effects of Bad FRAND Decisions 
It is a truism that arbitrators and other triers of fact often must 
confront sharply conflicting, and potentially misleading, expert 
testimony. There is no magic cure for this disease, though the 
preceding section can be read as a cautionary primer for the unwary. 
Arbitrators must do the best they can with the evidence placed before 
them. 
For better or worse, the decisions of arbitral panels are usually 
neither precedential nor reviewable.104 While these features of 
alternative dispute resolution solidify the harm from “bad,” but 
persuasive, economic testimony, they also tend to limit the extent of 
that harm, by confining its effects to an individual arbitration. 
FRAND arbitrations are different. Because a licensor has 
contracted not to discriminate among its licensees, a licensor whose 
benchmark FRAND terms and conditions have been decided by 
arbitration generally must submit the results of that benchmark award 
for consideration by subsequent arbitral panels, whose duty it is (on 
behalf of the licensor) not to discriminate with respect to the 
benchmark terms.105 
The preceding section makes clear that the licensor’s “non-
discrimination” obligation can be exploited in economic testimony to 
create a “downward non-discriminatory spiral” – which is, of course, 
discriminatory. Thus, an arbitration panel that awards “FRAND rates” 
 
104.  I intend this as an empirical observation, not as a statement of the law. The 
circumstances under which the decision (concerning FRAND terms and conditions, or in 
general) of an arbitral panel can or should be reviewed are outside the scope of this paper, and 
of economics in general. 
105.  These conclusions follow from the general nature of the licensor’s FRAND 
obligation. The point is to illustrate the mechanism by which the decision and findings of one 
arbitral panel may be considered by a later panel. The observations of this section do not and 
cannot interpret or inform the evidentiary or procedural requirements of any individual 
arbitration, which are governed by contract. 
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derived from the (mis)interpretation of “effective rates” ends up 
perpetuating and extending this discriminatory outcome in subsequent 
arbitrations – its errors are not confined to its own award. 
More generally, a licensor having multiple “benchmark” 
licenses, the terms of at least one of which have been formulated by 
an arbitration panel or other fact-finder, risks the possibility that the 
panel is persuaded by “bad” economic testimony. As a result, those 
fabricated terms will be inconsistent with the terms of the licensor’s 
actual arm’s-length agreements. In the absence of the licensor’s 
FRAND-derived non-discrimination obligation, that inconsistency 
might be buried, along with other non-precedential and unreviewable 
arbitral awards. But given that obligation, subsequent arbitrators must 
confront this inconsistency, trying to determine what it means “not to 
discriminate” among one set of license terms, negotiated by the 
licensor, and another set of terms crafted by arbitrators, which are 
inconsistent with the first set (and perhaps among themselves). 
While arbitrators (and humans in general) are well-known for 
their tendency to split the difference between these inconsistent 
positions, that tendency is, itself, discriminatory.106 And of course, 
splitting the difference creates additional inconsistencies down the 
road for later arbitrators, who themselves must enforce the licensor’s 
obligation not to discriminate among the (increasingly muddled) 
awards to its licensees. 
Economists refer to economic effects that are not confined to the 
transaction in which they occur as “spillover effects.”107 For example, 
when an innovator publishes a patent application, the disclosed 
information “spills over” to other innovators, reducing the cost and/or 
increasing the quality of their own innovations, thus speeding the 
pace of technological change and increasing the intensity of 
subsequent competition. Such “positive spillovers” are valuable by-
products of the patent system; like the incentive to invest in the initial 
 
106.  One can well imagine the outcry if a claimant wage-earner – say, a member of a 
racial minority – should have received an additional $1 per hour in wages, instead of the 50 
cents she actually received, because an arbitration panel “split the difference” between her true 
compensation and the $0 that her employer offered. Economic consequences aside, splitting 
the difference between the claimant’s and respondent’s positions perpetuates and rewards 
discrimination. 
107. Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D spillovers, patents and the incentives to innovate in 
Japan and the United States, 31 RES. POL’Y 1349, 1349-67 (2002). 
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innovation, such spillovers “promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts.” 
Inconsistencies among arbitral awards are an example of 
“negative spillovers.” They hinder the recovery of investment returns, 
increase transaction costs, complicate dispute resolution, promote 
further disputes, and muddy subsequent decisions to invest in R&D. 
Such inconsistencies represent a systemic failing in a system that is 
supposed to “promote progress,” not only through individual 
innovation, but through joint selection of the best among competing 
individual innovations. In short, inconsistency deprives everyone – 
including consumers – of some of the systemic gains from 
standardization that they might otherwise expect. 
While “equal treatment under the law” is, of course, a bedrock 
principle of justice, and a principle that arbitrators and other triers of 
fact generally strive to enforce, such treatment is subject to the usual 
vagaries of human interpretation. Thus it is unsurprising, if 
regrettable, that arbitration awards differ across complex 
circumstances in which “non-discriminatory treatment” is difficult to 
define, never mind to ascertain. 
All that said, if one is to interpret a licensor’s FRAND 
undertaking as a contractual commitment to an SDO, of which 
standard implementers are third-party beneficiaries, then “non-
discrimination” is not simply an abstract principle to be sought by 
neutral arbitrators, but a contractual obligation assumed by the 
licensor. This interpretation fundamentally alters the arbitrator’s role, 
from “equal treatment” of the claimant and respondent to the 
enforcement of a contractual claim by one party against the other. 
When an arbitration panel fails to assess that claim accurately, it 
makes three errors: (1) it fails to enforce the SDO contract; (2) it 
introduces additional discrimination into subsequent comparisons also 
based on that contract; (3) it hinders both the parties before it, and 
subsequent parties that must grapple with its award, from receiving 
equal treatment under the law.108 
 
108. See supra Section IV.C. 
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B. Examples 
1. Within-licensor Inconsistency 
Because arbitral awards are generally confidential, they are not 
subject to public comment or criticism. Thus, while the foregoing 
structural problems are both plausible and widespread, they are also 
difficult to illustrate with public data. 
Since 2013, a number of courts have issued public decisions 
concerning the appropriate “FRAND rate” for a standard-essential 
patent portfolio.109 As we have seen, setting a “FRAND rate” is itself 
a contractual misspecification, given a licensor’s undertaking to be 
prepared to license on “FRAND terms and conditions.” Be that as it 
may, such decisions and their bases are (at least partially) observable. 
Perhaps the first such determination was made in a proceeding 
brought by Huawei against InterDigital, in Huawei’s home town of 
Shenzhen, China. Huawei sought a determination that InterDigital had 
violated China’s Anti-Monopoly Law by, among other things, 
abusing its “dominant position” and charging “excessive prices” for 
InterDigital’s portfolio of SEPs.110 The Shenzhen Court agreed, 
awarding to Huawei a “FRAND rate” of 0.019% of the handset price 
– far less than InterDigital had sought and, presumably, far less than 
the rates found in its many other licenses.111 On appeal, the 
Guangdong Higher People’s Court affirmed. 
Although the decision of the Shenzhen court was sealed, 
InterDigital noted that the panel judges did not cite any factual basis 
 
109.  See generally Norman V. Siebrasse and Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined 
FRAND Royalties, in Jose Contreras (ed.), THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
110.  Michael Han and Kexin Li, Huawei v. InterDigital: China at the Crossroads of 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Competition and Innovation, COMPETITION POL’Y, INT’L  
(2013), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/AsiaNovember3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UMF6-A6HG]. 
111.  See Form 10-K, INTERDIGITAL, INC. (Dec. 31, 2012), 
http://ir.interdigital.com/file//Index?KeyFile=392296770&Output=3&OSID=9 
[https://perma.cc/6XEU-ATC7]. That the ruling was adverse can be inferred from 
InterDigital’s appeal. That its result was materially different from InterDigital’s anticipated 
licensing program can be inferred from InterDigital’s public disclosure obligations to its 
shareholders. 
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for the royalty rate awarded.112 Contemporaneous reporting further 
calls into question the court's commitment to enforcing the “non-
discrimination” provision.113 This peculiar circumstance may appear 
idiosyncratic. But it illustrates a more pervasive problem: the rate 
awarded by the trier of fact may be disclosed, but the basis for the 
rate may not be (because it depends on confidential or otherwise 
unpublished facts). Needless to say, to the extent that the published 
rate is sharply lower than the rest of a licensor’s licenses and offers, 
for unobservable reasons, and that rate can be divorced from the 
agreement’s (likewise unobservable) remaining terms and conditions, 
prospective licensees have the obvious incentive to demand the “same 
rate” on the grounds of “non-discrimination.” Such “bad decisions” 
then follow a licensor around, like the undead, neither affirmed nor 
repudiated, until they can be distinguished for reasons of age or 
dissimilarity. 
2. Between-licensor Inconsistency 
Of course, “persistent bad decisions” are not persistent or bad 
simply because they are unexplained. Sometimes the explanation 
itself is inconsistent with “similar” decisions. And while there exist 
mechanisms, such as courts of appeal, for reconciling inconsistent 
legal decisions, those mechanisms do not exist for inconsistent factual 
inferences, or inconsistent decisions across sovereign jurisdictions. 
And they do not exist for inconsistent arbitral awards, at all. 
Again to illustrate the potential for inconsistency, consider the 
court’s reasoning in TCL v. Ericsson,114 a recent decision that 
 
112.  See id. at 136 (“The court further ruled that the royalties to be paid by Huawei for 
InterDigital’s 2G, 3G and 4G essential Chinese patents under Chinese law should not exceed 
0.019% of the actual sales price of each Huawei product, without explanation as to how it 
arrived at this calculation”). 
113.  According to contemporaneous reporting, Qiu Yongqing, a senior judge who 
presided over the case at the Guangdong Higher People’s Court, stated that: 
 
Huawei “used antitrust law as a weapon to counterattack” monopolization by 
multinationals in the technology sector, and that other Chinese companies 
should learn from Huawei.  He went on to suggest that Chinese companies 
should utilize antitrust litigation to overcome technology barriers and thereby 
better develop themselves. 
See Han, supra note 110, at 9. 
114.   TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM 
Ericsson, No. SAVC 14-00341 JVS, 2013 WL 4150033, slip op. at 14ff (C.D. Cal. 2017) 
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purported to determine a “FRAND rate” for Ericsson’s SEP 
portfolios. This decision adopted a so-called “top-down approach,” 
under which the court determines a top-line aggregate industry 
royalty rate for all SEPs, then divides this aggregate rate among each 
of the firms holding SEPs, in proportion to the size of its portfolio 
(perhaps after further adjustments). 
While the TCL decision may be faulted on many legal, 
conceptual and empirical grounds, for present purposes what matters 
is that the court took as its starting point Ericsson’s 2008 belief that 
the aggregate industry royalty rate would be “6-8%” of the handset 
price for all LTE SEPs, and that Ericsson would own 20-25% of those 
SEPs.115 The court reasoned that Ericsson’s “statements were thus not 
a hope or prediction, but a pledge to the market that if the market 
adopted Ericsson’s championed standard, the total aggregate royalties 
would be calculated as described above.”116 While Ericsson 
“point[ed] out that the publicly declared rates in 2010 from just nine 
SEP owners totaled 14.8% of the handset selling price,” the court 
“discounted” these conflicting beliefs.117 How Ericsson’s beliefs 
could bind all others who contributed SEPs to “the market,” or how 
third-party beliefs different from Ericsson’s might be reconciled with 
Ericsson’s so as to preserve “fairness” or “non-discrimination,” the 
TCL court did not explain. 
In any event, it is useful to compare the TCL court’s assumption 
of a 6-8% “pledged” aggregate royalty rate with the comparable 
inference from the Huawei v. InterDigital award. InterDigital is 
generally considered one of the top 10 holders of patents disclosed as 
potentially essential to 2G, 3G and 4G standards, based on its quantity 
of patents. Leaving aside questions of portfolio quality and “actual 
essentiality,”118 it is reasonable to assume (for the purposes of 
illustration) that InterDigital’s portfolio constitutes at least 
approximately 1/25 (4%) of the industry total. That assumption 
 
115. Id. at 22. 
116. Id. at 24. 
117. Id. 
118. In other work, I have estimated the quality of firm-level patent portfolios using 
generally accepted patent-citation methods. I have also estimated the firm-level probability 
that a patent disclosed as potentially essential is “actually essential,” from multiple large-
sample technical evaluations. While these measurements are empirically important to an actual 
FRAND-based valuation of an SEP portfolio, they are beyond the scope of this paper and do 
not detract from the present illustration. 
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implies that the aggregate industry royalty rate should be about 25 x 
0.019% (0.475%), or a little less than one-half of one percent. But the 
TCL court’s assumption (6-8%) is more than an order of magnitude 
(12 to 16 times) greater than the aggregate rate implied from the 
Shenzhen decision. 
Note again that these “top line” conclusions apply to the same 
body of essential patents, covering the same devices, in the same 
industry. Under the “top-down method,” this range means that a 
licensor’s total compensation can vary from $10 million to $120-160 
million, even assuming that both parties agree on the licensor’s share 
of the “top line.” 
An arbitrator stepping into these waters could be forgiven for the 
inference that, when published trial court decisions as to what 
constitutes a “fair” and “reasonable” “FRAND rate” differ by this 
much, there is in fact no generally accepted “standard” by which to 
measure any such rate at all, and that the best course of action is to 
approach the problem with “fresh eyes.” And so the cycle continues. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As we observed at the outset, the demand for FRAND 
arbitrations springs from the demand for the resolution of disputes 
that have little public precedent: the neutral pricing of unspecified 
patents in large, uncertain, adversarial, private contracts. Given the 
asymmetric institutional and contractual obligations of the contracting 
parties, the demand for such resolutions is likely to increase, as SEP 
licensors can demand no more, and SEP licensees can do no worse, 
than “FRAND terms and conditions” – however defined. Those 
incentives often create unbridgeable, structural, differences: the 
prospective licensor must match its offer to its prior agreements, 
while the prospective licensee pays no penalty for insisting on terms 
superior to those agreements. 
The determination of a “non-discriminatory” “FRAND rate” is 
complicated further by bad economic analysis, which is ubiquitous. 
This analysis takes two forms: the regulatory and academic advocacy 
of unproven and unmeasurable concepts like systemic hold-up, and 
“ex ante prices,” which encourage de novo construction of a “FRAND 
rate”; and tactical errors by experts who advocate “effective rates” 
and other non-contractual parameters. Such testimony sometimes 
carries undeserved weight, as when arbitrators credit it over the terms 
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actually negotiated by actual market participants, who – most 
economists would agree – are better informed than any economist or 
arbitrator. Unfortunately, distinguishing good from bad testimony 
itself requires good economic training – a requirement that “economic 
experts” themselves often do not meet, never mind arbitrators. 
The flames of demand for arbitration have been fanned by those 
who argue that the arbitration of a “FRAND rate” should be 
mandatory. If only – goes the argument – the parties faced “baseball 
arbitration” – under which the arbitrators choose one side’s proposal, 
or the other’s, without modification – the results would converge to 
the true “FRAND rate.”119 Of course, as we again have seen, the 
“FRAND rate” cannot be divorced from other “FRAND terms and 
conditions.” And “FRAND terms and conditions” must, by definition, 
be non-discriminatory. But there is nothing about “baseball” 
proposals to ensure that the proposal proffered by either party is, in 
fact, non-discriminatory – even if it is otherwise “reasonable.” 
Into this structural quagmire the “FRAND rate”-setter is thrust. 
Other than exposing some of the analytical and empirical errors 
that routinely enter into FRAND proceedings, I can recommend no 
failsafe procedure for the complex process of determining “FRAND 
terms and conditions.” But one sure sign that a “FRAND rate”-setter 
has erred along the way is that she crafts a set of terms that will be 
uniformly chosen by the licensor’s subsequent licensees in later 
proceedings. Such an agreement is said to “dominate” the licensor’s 
existing agreements, and so must – by definition – discriminate 
relative to them. In other words, the arbitrator must subject her 
determination to the discipline of subsequent review, by courts or 
other arbitrators, with an eye to not creating “dominant” terms and 
thus avoiding the “downward ‘non-discriminatory’ spiral.” When the 
“FRAND rate”-setter effects, rather than prevents, discrimination in 
favor of one party, she not only amplifies systemic weaknesses, but 
she needlessly (and permanently) hinders the licensor, future 
licensees, and future arbitrators, from reaching a just, consistent and 
non-discriminatory result. By definition, such arbitrated terms and 
conditions are not FRAND. 
  
 
119.  See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 1144.  
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